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IMMORTALITY AT THE CANDY COUNTER-
THE STORY OF NATIONWIDE
TRADEMARK PROTECTION*
Roger A. Stetter**
THE "HORNBOOK" LAW PRIOR TO 1966 A COMMON
LAW TRADEMARK Is GOOD EVERYWHERE
Toward the end of the last century an eastern wholesale
drug company desired to adopt a certain trademark for a
cough remedy.' The company, having made a diligent but
fruitless search to determine whether the proposed
trademark was already in use in the United States, exten-
sively advertised its cough remedy bearing the particular
trademark and met with considerable commercial success.
Eventually the company learned that a retail druggist in a
small city in the West was using the same trademark for a
cough remedy and had been using it long before the company
first used it.
Although the druggist had made no claim of infringement
against the drug company and perhaps was entirely ignorant
of the latter's cough remedy, the law was by no means clear
* The title was suggested by A. BARACH, FAMOUS AMERICAN TRADE-
MARKS (1971), a collection of stories which originally appeared as a regular
feature of Changing Times magazine on the birth of well-known American
trademarks. One of these stories relates how a poor candymaker from Vie-
nna, upon arriving in New York City, settled down in a combined apartment
and candy shop and proceeded to sell a penny candy which he called "Tootsie
Roll" after his childhood sweetheart "Tootsie." Sales increased from two
hundred rolls a day to millions, and the candymaker thus "gave his
sweetheart a sort of immortality at the candy counter." Id. at 173.
The "Tootsie Roll" story, paralleling that -of many other famous trade-
marks, vividly illustrates the Lanham Trademark Act's rationale for nation-
wide protection, summed up by a trade witness testifying at the Congressio-
nal hearings preceding its enactment, who remarked, "No one knows when,
he adopts a trade-mark how extensive his business will become. It may
spread over the whole country, or it may not." Hearings on H.R. 82 Befbre the
Subcomm. on H.R. 82 of the Senate Comm. of Patents, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. 46
(1944).
** Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University; Visiting As-
sistant Professor, 1975-76, University of Tennessee College of Law.
1. See F. MOORE, LEGAL PROTECTION OF GOODWILL 139-41 (1936). But ef.
Tetlow v. Tappan, 85 F. 774 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1898). See also Hearings on H.R. 102
Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th
Cong., 1st Sess. 75-76 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Hearings].
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that the druggist could not enjoin the drug company from
further use of the trademark based upon the simple fact of his
prior appropriation, should he choose to enforce it. At the
very least, the druggist could exclude the drug company from
his trade territory while continuing to enjoy the benefit of the
latter's reputation and advertising. He might exact an exor-
bitant price for the surrender of his trademark rights, or he
might hasten into territory that was within his "natural"
field of expansion, but that the drug company was arranging
to occupy with its national brand. In these circumstances, the
company felt it was imprudent to expend any more money in
building up the trademark.
One of the company's lawyers then concocted and exe-
cuted an ingenious plan for rescuing the goodwill associated
with its successful trademark. He journeyed to the western
city where the retail druggist was located, took lodgings in a
local boarding house, and proceeded to become a resident of
that city. In time he made the acquaintance of the retail
druggist and for a handsome price purchased the druggist's
business, lock, stock and barrel, including the trademark and
goodwill for his cough remedy. Some time later, the attorney
told the druggist that he desired to resell him the drugstore
in order that he might return East. The druggist reacquired
his drugstore for less money than he had received for it, but
the attorney reserved to himself and his assigns the trade-
mark for the cough remedy, including that part of the good-
will of the business connected with it. When he returned
home, the attorney assigned to his client, the drug company,
the rights which he had reserved from the resale.
The anecdote illustrates the plight of a junior user of a
trademark who has expended money and talent in its success-
ful exploitation in ignorance of prior use 2 by someone else. If
the means for ascertaining prior user are inadequate, it is
inequitable to permit a static senior user, such as the retail
druggist, to take over, under claim of prior right to the
trademark, territorial markets that are beyond his provincial
trade area and that have been developed by a dynamic, good
faith junior user. On the other hand, consider the hardship of
2. On the requirements of user, see Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and
Trade Names-An Analysis and Synthesis II, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 759, 764-68
(1930). For a recent case illustrating the complexity of the concept, see Blue
Bell, Inc. v. Farah Mfg. Co., 508 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1975).
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requiring a senior trademark user who has diligently ex-
panded his business from the east to the west coast to aban-
don his trademark at the California border, where he is met
for the first time by a good faith junior user who claims the
exclusive right to use the trademark in California. Not only is
it expensive and difficult to use different trademarks on the
same goods in different territory,3 but if the good faith junior
user is granted exclusive rights in California, the senior user
has lost whatever benefits might be expected to accrue from
the introduction into new territory of a popularly
trademarked article, one that has caught on elsewhere. The
point of the comparison with the dynamic junior user is to
emphasize the interest of the first user of a trademark to
extend his trade into new territory as the popularity of his
trademarked goods grows. How should the law balance these
competing interests?
One might suppose that the proper way to resolve con-
flicts respecting the right of a person to use a trademark upon
his goods in a disputed territory or to retain whatever terri-
torial markets he previously exploited would be to inquire
who was there first. That facile answer would completely
ignore the interest of the first person to use a trademark for
his goods in gradually extending his trade into new territory
as his business grows, or would place a premium on overex-
tended advertising and rash selling efforts not warranted by
a concern's resources. 4 Only the vastly wealthy corporations
could immediately occupy every market in the country. On
the other hand, if priority of appropriation should settle these
conflicts, how can one know before he selects a trademark and
expends a fortune in building up trade under it whether it is
already being used by another in some remote corner of our
3. See 1941 Hearings at 76; cf. Maatschappij Tot Exploitatie v. Kosloff, 45
F.2d 94 (2d Cir.), on rehearing, 45 F.2d 98 (1930) (commercial impracticability
of printing distinguishing phrase on candy wrapper no excuse). But cf. W.E.
Bassett Co. v. Revlon Inc., 354 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1966) (modifying preliminary
injunction to allow defendant to market existing inventories of articles al-
ready marked with an infringing trademark).
4. See J. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UN-
FAIR COMPETITION § 14, at 24-25 (4th ed. 1924) [hereinafter cited as HOPKINS];
H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 218b, at
573-75 (3d ed. 1936), for this same criticism of Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916), discussed infra in text at note 12 et seq., which
adopts a qualified version of this position.
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broadly extended country? Any solution failing to address
these competing considerations would be unsatisfactory.
Prior to 1916, when the United States Supreme Court was
first called upon to settle an issue respecting the territorial
claims of different trademark users, the law on this question
was scanty and confused. Some cases held that priority of
appropriation settled the question, whether the prior user
had extended his trade to the infringer's territory and irre-
spective of the good faith or length of time during which the
junior user had been exploiting the trademark. 5 Possibly ad-
verting to the distinction between the quantum of proof
necessary to sustain an injunction against the use of a valid
technical trademark and that proof required to suppress rival
use of a trade name, 6 some courts facing the question of the
5. See Standard Brewery Co. v. Interboro Brewing Co., 229 F. 543 (2d Cir.
1916) (registered trademark); Hygeia Distilled Water Co. v. Consolidated Ice
Co., 144 F. 139 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1906), aff'd, 151 F. 10 (3d Cir. 1907); HOPKINS at
§ 14.
6. Assuming the presence of actual market competition between the par-
ties, the trademark owner needed only to prove that the defendant, subse-
quent to plaintiff's prior user, put the same or a confusingly similar
trademark upon competing goods. He did not have to show that he had used
the trademark for a particular period of time or that the mark had achieved
any public recognition. See 2 H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
AND TRADE-MARKS § 319 (4th ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as NIMS]; cf. RE-
STATEMENT OF TORTS § 717, comment a, at 562 (1938); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS §§ 715, 719-20, and comments (Tent. Draft. No. 8, 1963). See,
e.g., Kathreiner's Malzkaffee Fabriken v. Pastor Kneipp Medicine Co., 82 F.
321 (7th Cir. 1897).
In contrast, the holder of a brand name not a technical common law
trademark-could seek relief only via suit for unfair competition and would be
protected only if he could establish actual or probable deception of the public
to his harm. To prove the actual or probable deception he had to establish
that the name denoted to an appreciable segment of the purchasing public
that the goods bearing the brand were of his make, or had acquired a secon-
dary meaning, thereby achieving "trade name" status. See, e.g., G. & C.
Merriam Co. v. Saalfield, 198 F. 369, 373 (6th Cir. 1912); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 716, comments a, b, at 559-60 (1938); cf' Upjohn Co. v. William S.
Merrell Chemical Co., 269 F. 209 (6th Cir. 1920), cert. denied, 257 U.S. 638
(1921) (appearance of product as trade name).
Hence, a trade name could not travel to territory where its owner had no
trade, and once such a trade name did make its appearance in territory
distinct from its previous use, the holder would have to establish its secon-
dary meaning in the new territory before he could claim any legal protection
against its use by a rival trader. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Kaufman, 223 Mass.
104, 111 N.E. 691 (1916); C.A. Briggs Co. v. National Wafer Co., 215 Mass. 100,
102 N.E. 87 (1913); 1 NIMS at § 35a; W. DERENBERG, TRADE-MARK PROTEC-
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territorial scope of protection of trademarks and nearly all of
the treatise writers on trademarks concluded that the exclu-
sive right to use a common law trademark was, according to
the weight of authority,7 or should be, according to the proper
function of a trademark,8 co-extensive with the territory of
the United States.
Even after the United States Supreme Court rejected the
view that the right of a trademark owner could be projected
in advance of actual trade,9 or that the owner could preempt
markets previously exploited by others,10 the courts con-
tinued to apply the previous law that very slight use of a
trademark, as distinguished from a trade name, in a disputed
field of trade would establish that territory as belonging ex-
clusively to the trademark owner as against any subsequent
user.1 1.
HANOVER STAR MILLING COMPANY V. METCALF:
THE NEIGHBORHOOD THEORY OF TRADE
In 1916 the United States Supreme Court announced an
opinion in two combined cases on an important issue of
trademark law that had divided the courts of appeals.1 2 The
litigation arose when an Alabama merchant, unable by rea-
son of an exclusive dealership to procure the plaintiff's "Tea
Rose" flour, received a carload of another concern's flour, also
labeled "Tea Rose," and sold it in packages so closely resem-
bling the plaintiff's as might well mislead the public.1 3 As the
TION AND UNFAIR TRADING § 44 (1936) [hereinafter cited as DERENBERG]
(citing many cases); cj: Thomas G. Carroll & Son Co. v. McIlvaine & Baldwin,
Inc., 171 F. 125 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909).
7. See HOPKINS at § 14.
8. See H. NIMS, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
§ 218b, at 569 (3d ed. 1936) (no settled rule as to territorial extent of common
law rights, but advocating no territorial limitation). But cf DERENBERG § 39,
at 452-55 (qualified praise for narrower recognition based on idea of state
sovereignty, notwithstanding well-founded contrary views). For later discus-
sion of the problem see 1 NIMS at § 218b.
9. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
10. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918)
(actual market competition).
11. See text at note 57, infra.
12. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
13. The statement of facts is taken in part from the lower court reports
of the circuit courts of appeals decisions. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen &
Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513 (7th Cir. 1913); Metcalf v. Hanover Star Milling Co.,
204 F. 211 (5th Cir. 1913).
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federal court had no jurisdiction over the other manufac-
turer, the Steelville Company, plaintiff immediately brought
suit against the merchant for contributory infringement of its
alleged trademark "Tea Rose" and for unfair competition in
trade, alleging a fraudulent intent by the merchant, by
means of misrepresentations and of substantially identical
brands and make-up of packages, to palm off upon customers
the Steelville Company Tea Rose flour as being the same Tea
Rose flour made by plaintiff, the Hanover Star Milling Com-
pany. The district court granted a temporary injunction re-
straining Metcalf, the merchant, from selling within its dis-
trict flour labeled "Tea Rose" not made by plaintiff.14 Upon
appeal from the order, the decree was reversed with direc-
tions to dismiss plaintiff's suit.15
Within a few months of the first suit, a third concern,
Allen & Wheeler Company, which had been using the words
"Tea Rose" as a trademark for flour from a date prior to
either Hanover or the Steelville Company, sued to restrain
Hanover from infringing Allen & Wheeler's common law
trademark, alleging that it had learned recently that Han-
over was using the same trademark for flour made by it, and,
notwithstanding notice of infringement, persisted in the sale
of its flour under that name. Plaintiff's suit presented no
question of unfair competition, but rested upon trademark
infringement, pure and simple. The federal district court in
Illinois granted plaintiff's request for a temporary injunction
restraining Hanover from using "Tea Rose" as a trademark
for flour anywhere in the United States, although there was
no actual market competition between the parties. 16 Upon
appeal from the order, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the decree in an opinion concluding that plaintiff
had no cause of action in equity. 17
The bewildering history of these two cases gives credence
to Harry Nim's statement that until 1916, when the United
States Supreme Court decided Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf' 8 the law applicable to the territorial extent of tech-
14. The district court decision is unreported. See 240 U.S. at 407.
15. See Metcalf v. Hanover Star Milling Co., 204 F. 211 (5th Cir. 1913).
16. The district court decision is unreported. See 240 U.S. at 407-08.
17. See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513 (7th
Cir. 1913).
18. 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
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nical trademark rights was doubtful and unsatisfactory. 19 In
Hanover the court launched its opinion in the combined cases
by noting that, first, Allen & Wheeler had established beyond
question that it had used the words "Tea Rose" as a trade-
mark for flour long before either Hanover or the Steelville
Company. However, although Allen & Wheeler stated in its
bill and affidavits that its trade in "Tea Rose" flour extended
throughout the United States and that since its incorporation
in 1904 it had continuously used this trademark on flour, the
court noted a "remarkable absence of particular statements
as to time, place, or circumstances; in short, no showing
whatever as to the extent of the use or the markets
reached. '20 Furthermore, the record contained positive proof
that Allen & Wheeler's "Tea Rose" flour had neither been
offered for sale nor heard of by the flour trade in Alabama or
adjoining states; the only sales of its "Tea Rose" actually
proven were in territory north of the Ohio River during the
1870's. Second, "upon the question of trademark rights as
between the Hanover and Steelville companies, the proofs
[were] somewhat conflicting." 21 Hanover's trademark user of
"Tea Rose" antedated the Steelville Company's by approxi-
mately a decade, but the particulars and extent of use by both
concerns before 1903 was in doubt. The proofs did not show
any business done by the Steelville Company in the south-
eastern states, apart from the shipment to Metcalf in Ala-
bama in 1912 which precipitated the litigation, since 1905,
when it retreated from the Mississippi market leaving
Hanover in complete control. On the other hand, the proofs
did show that beginning in the year 1904 Hanover vigorously
promoted its "Tea Rose" flour throughout the state of
Alabama and adjoining states, so that its sales in that terri-
tory exceeded $150,000 a year when suit was filed against
Metcalf, and that the words "Tea Rose" had acquired a "sec-
ondary meaning" in that market denoting flour made by
Hanover. Third, Hanover had adopted the "Tea Rose"
trademark in complete ignorance of Allen & Wheeler's use of
that term.
Without reaching Hanover's claim of affirmative trade-
mark rights, the Court, differing sharply with the circuit
19. See H. NIMs, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS
§ 218b, at 568 (3d ed. 1936).
20. 240 U.S. at 409.
21. Id. at 421.
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court's evaluation of the evidence, had little difficulty in con-
cluding that "Metcalf's purpose to take advantage of the
reputation of the Hanover Company's 'Tea Rose' flour [was]
so manifest ' 22 that he was guilty of unfair competition in
attempting to palm off upon customers the Steelville "Tea
Rose" flour as being the same as Hanover's established
brand. It reversed the decree of the circuit court which had
acquitted Metcalf of unfair competition and trademark in-
fringement and had allowed concurrent user of the
trademark and confusingly similar trade dress by both par-
ties.
The Court's disposition of the case, leaving Allen &
Wheeler out of the question, did nothing to alter hitherto
accepted principles of unfair competition, since the circuit
court of appeals, misapplying the fraud rule, denied relief
under the head of unfair competition on the untenable
ground that "[tlo entitle the plaintiff to protection against
unfair competition in the dress of goods, it should be clearly
shown that he had established the exclusive right by prior
adoption to dress his goods in the manner claimed. ' 23
Turning to the more important case of Allen & Wheeler
Co. v. Hanover Star Milling Co.,24 both the equitable rule
against unjust enrichment and the public interest in prevent-
ing deception by a look-alike trademark bade well for Han-
over. Denying Allen & Wheeler's pro Jbrma pleading for an
accounting of defendant's profits25 would not avoid the ap-
pearance of unjust enrichment if Allen & Wheeler could still
dominate the southeastern territory which Hanover had de-
veloped so assiduously. On the other hand, granting Hanover
the right to continue using "Tea Rose" on its flour in the
southeastern territory without recognizing any right by it to
exclude the prior user, Allen & Wheeler, in that same terri-
tory would not solve the problem of public confusion; 2 6 on the
22. Id. at 423.
23. Metcalf v. Hanover Star Milling Co., 204 F. 211, 216 (5th Cir. 1913)
(emphasis added).
24. Consolidated with Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403
(1916).
25. Id. at 408.
26. The Court declined to rule on the Hanover Company's right to such
relief, not requested below, since resolution of the Allen & Wheeler case did
not demand it, and also remarked, incomprehensibly, "In view of possible
consequences to the rights of parties not before the court, it is desirable to
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contrary, the "Tea Rose" trademark would thereby lose its
usefulness as a means of enabling the public to get what it
wanted.
In order for the Court to maintain persuasively, as it
sought to do, that it would indeed be "unjust" to allow Allen
& Wheeler to exclude Hanover from the southeastern terri-
tory, first it had to establish that Hanover was not a trespass-
er, or, at the very least, that its trespass had ripened into an
irrevocable license. The Court, not content to rest its holding
on either ground, proferred both: Hanover was not a
trespasser since there is no such thing as "property" in a
trademark otherwise than with reference to a trade; what-
ever trademark rights Allen & Wheeler might be able to as-
sert against others-in the southeastern territory, it was "es-
topped" to assert trademark infringement against Hanover
as to that territory.
In partially resting its holding on the legal conclusion
that Allen & Wheeler was estopped to assert trademark in-
fringement against Hanover in the southeastern territory,
the Court went further than any existing precedent in recog-
nizing the defense of laches as a bar to injunctive relief in
cases of trademark infringement. Apart from two unusual
cases 27 an injunction in a trademark case had never been
denied on the ground of "estoppel by negligence. 28
Since every sale under the infringing trademark consti-
tutes a new invasion of the original trademark owner's legal
right, and the remedy of injunction is merely in aid of the
legal right, the injunction is "a matter of course" if the legal
right is proved to exist. 29 Inexcusable delay in seeking relief
may well bar an account of profits, 30 but the right to an
limit the range of our decision as much as practicable. . . ." Id. at 411. A year
later, in United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918), the
Court again left the question dangling since the good faith junior user of
plaintiff's trademark had not requested such relief. 248 U.S. at 104.
27. Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900) (Court's
disposition of trademark count and one for package and trade-dress simula-
tion inconsistent); Theodore Rectanus v. United Drug Co., 226 F. 545, 552 (6th
Cir. 1915) (on petition for rehearing), aff'd, 2,18 U.S. 90 (1918).
28. Theodore Rectanus v. United Drug Co., 226 F. 545, 552 (6th Cir. 1915)
(on petition for rehearing), aff'd,. 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
29. See Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888), citing Fullwood v.
Fullwood, [1878] 9 Ch. D. 176, discussed in 2 NIMS at § 409.
30. See Gilka v. Mihalovitch, 50 F. 427, 428 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892) (relief
denied because "a complainant might conclude that it would answer his
1976]
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injunction against future acts of infringement is not lost by
delay without more.3 l The facts and circumstances of the case
also must render it inequitable to grant the trademark owner
any relief. Then injunctive relief as well as an accounting is
denied pursuant to the maxim, "He who seeks equity must do
it. ' '32 If the owner had actual knowledge of the wrong and
thereafter unreasonably delayed in bringing suit to put a stop
to it, 33 and if in the meantime the "innocent ' 34 infringer had
expended money and effort in enhancing the reputation of
the particular trademark, it would be unjust to stop him from
continuing to use it, and equity would decline to interfere
with his established business. 35
Allen & Wheeler did not know that Hanover was using its
trademark "Tea Rose" on flour until a short time before suit
was commenced. Therefore the Court broke new ground when
it said, "Even if [Allen & Wheeler] did not know-and it does
not appear that they did know-that the Hanover Company
was doing so, they must be held to have taken the risk that
some innocent party might, during their forty years of inac-
tivity, hit upon the same mark and expend money and effort
in building up a trade in flour under it. ' ' 36
The only interest of a trademark owner in preventing
future use of a mark in a market where his goods are not sold
purpose to lot the defendant go on selling four or five years, and at the end of
that time call him to an account of profits as if he were the complainant's
salesman").
31. See Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S.
245 (1878); Bissell Chilled Plow Works v. T.M. Bissell Plow Co., 121 F. 357
(C.C.W.D. Mich. 1902); cJ: Richardson v. D.M. Osborne & Co., 82 F. 95
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897) (patent expiry precluded injunctive relief); Estes v.
Worthington, 22 F. 822 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885) (preliminary injunction). But see
Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900).
32. See Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 524 (1888).
33. See French Republic v. Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., 191 U.S. 427
(1903); Valvoline Oil Co. v. Havoline Oil Co., 211 F. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Gilka
v. Mihalovitch, 50 F. 427 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892) (sufficiency of defensive plead-
ing). But cf Saxlehner v. Eisner & Mendelson Co., 179 U.S. 19 (1900).
34. See, e.g., Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 523 (1888) (emphasizing
fraud of defendant); c.! Gillot v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 455, 480 (Sup. Ct. 1867)
(knowledge of others' widespread use of trademark does not constitute aban-
donment when infringer is guilty of fraud), af'd, 48 N.Y. Rep. 374, 379 (Ct.
App. 1872) (sustaining trial judge who found trademark owner had no knowl-
edge of adverse use). For a discussion of the related defenses of abandonment
and acquiescence, see 2 NIMS at §§ 407-08, 416.
35. See Valvoline Oil Co. v. Havoline Oil Co., 211 F. 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1913).
36. 240 U.S. at 419.
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or known is to preempt the market for later exploitation or to
avoid any tarnishment to his trademark which may come
about through the latecomer's business practices. The fact
that the trademark owner has made some belated efforts to
sell his goods in the new market just prior to bringing suit
should not have any bearing on the relative weight his inter-
est in territorial expansion receives as against the late-
comer's right to continue using the mark.37 And, although the
inferiority of the infringer's goods and resultant harm to the
trademark's reputation is usually presumed from the fact of
his adoption of another's trademark, 38 it may be appropriate
in the class of cases now Under consideration to require
affirmative proof that defendant's product is substandard or
his business methods unethical.3 9
Perhaps the attenuated interests of the trademark owner
in safeguarding the integrity of his trademark in an area of
potential future market expansion should give way more
readily to any conflicting interests of the latecomer than
when the junior user enters an existing market, especially if
the latecomer's use of the trademark. in an appendent market
has continued so long or under such circumstances that the
trademark denotes goods made by him rather than by the
prior user.40 Public recognition of the trademark is more
likely to occur in an appendent market where the latecomer's
use of the mark has been exclusive than when two concerns
have concurrently used the trademark in the same market.
An injunction that allows the prior user to step into the
infringer's shoes under these circumstances will result in de-
ception of purchasers. 41
37. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918),
discussed in text at note 54, infra.
38. See Gillot v. Esterbrook, 47 Barb. 455, 467-68 (Sup. Ct. 1867).
39. Cf. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960);
S.C. Johnson & Son v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1949); Triangle Publica-
tions Inc. v. Rohrlich, 167 F.2d 969, 981 (2d Cir. 1948) (Frank, J., dissenting).
But cf. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928); Philadel-
phia Storage Battery Co. v. Mindlin, 163 Misc. 52, 296 N.Y.S. 176, 179 (Sup. Ct.
1937). "
40. See Dwinell-Wright Co. v. White House Milk, Inc., 132 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1943) (related but non-competing goods).
41. One way of expressing these different considerations is by varying
the content of the defense of laches. Dereliction of duty to police appendent
markets, rather than actual knowledge of infringement, would bar injunctive
relief in different territory. See Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 524 (1888)
1976]
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In passing to the broader ground of decision rejecting
Allen & Wheeler's claim of trademark property independent
of an existing trade, the Court approved the argument, ad-
vanced so ably by the appellate judge,42 that trade names
came to be protected along the same principles as trademarks
since the essence of the wrong in both kinds of cases is the
same, consisting in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer
for those of another. The appellate judge had concluded:
"They are all cases of unfair competition in trade .... To the
extent that differences exist, they pertain, not to the underly-
ing principle, but to the methods and degrees of proof re-
quired to enforce the principle. ' '43 It necessarily resulted that
the plaintiff's technical trademark did not make an iota of
difference, for he could suffer no cognizable legal harm if
there was "no article to wear the badge and no trader to offer
the article. 44
The doctrine that disparate treatment of trade names
and trademarks is unsound because it is rooted in an irra-
tional fear of monopoly has found great proponents. 45 The
assimilation of trade names to trademarks is the chief hall-
mark of modern trademark law.46 However, the proponents of
this view have argued for wider recognition of the true func-
tion of trademarks and trade names, with correspondingly
greater protection with reference to the kinds of goods and
(dictum); Chandon Champagne Corp. v. San Marino Wine Corp., 335 F.2d 531,
535 (2d Cir. 1964); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 751, comments b & d, at 666-68
(1938); cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 497-98 (2d
Cir. 1961); Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607, 614 (2d Cir.
1960).
In passing upon the respective claims of the parties, no question of
federal or state registration of trademarks was involved, as neither party
had taken the trouble to register its claimed trademark. The Court left open
what the effect of registration by a prior user might be on the defense of
"good faith" and the acquisition by a junior user of concurrent territorial
rights in the trademark.
42. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 517 (7th
Cir. 1913). See generally F. SCHECTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
THE LAW RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS 150-60 (1925); Handler & Pickett,
Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis and Synthesis I, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 168 (1930) [hereinafter cited as Handler & Pickett].
43. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 518 (7th
Cir. 1913).
44. Id. at 519.
45. See Handler & Pickett at 168, passim.
46. See text at notes 244-53, infra.
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territorial markets in which the exclusive right to use a
trademark or trade name is claimed, not for the balkanization
of commerce under a "neighborhood theory of trade.
'47
The difficulty with the Court's opinion is therefore not in
its premise that the law of trademarks is but part of the
broader law of unfair competition, but in the inadequate rec-
ognition which is given to other interests of a trademark
owner, apart from preventing the diversion of his custom
which results when a second trader competes under the same
mark in the same market. 48 Although the Court used a qual-
ifying phrase and a caveat that leaves the trademark owner
some elusive amount of room to grow, the opinion, in its
essential features, advances a theory of trademark protection
that is out of step with the times.
Writing for a unanimous court, Mr. Justice Pitney said:
In the ordinary case of parties competing under the
same mark in the same market, it is correct to say that
prior appropriation settles the question [because the use
by a second trader amounts to an attempt to sell his
goods as those of his competitor]. But where two parties
independently are employing the same mark upon goods
of the same class, but in separate markets wholly remote
the one from the other, the question of prior appropria-
tion is legally insignificant [because a trademark is not
the subject of property except in connection with an exist-
ing business, and its adoption does not project the right of
protection in advance of trade]; unless, at least, it appears
that the second adopter has selected the mark with some
design inimical to the interests of the first user, such as to
take the benefit of the reputation of his goods, to forestall
the extension of his trade, or the like.49
The opinion contains qualifying language recognizing
that a trademark owner may obtain redress in territory
where no business is done because his goodwill may precede
his trade, and a second comer may not take the benefit of the
reputation of the trademark owner's goods. Later cases, fall-
47. See Handler & Pickett at 168, passim; Schechter, The Rational Basis
of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813, 824(1927).
48. For trenchant criticism of the case, see the treatises cited in notes 4
& 8, supra.
49. 240 U.S. at 415.
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ing within this "Hanover exception," protect the trademark
owner against invaders of his so-called "reputation zone. '50
An intent to forestall the trademark owner's trade by hasten-
ing into markets he was arranging to occupy has been given
similar recognition in subsequent cases. 51
The only recognition given to the interest that the
trademark owner has in expanding his business under a suc-
cessful trademark is contained in a parting caveat that reads:
"We are not dealing with a case where the junior appro-
priator of a trademark is occupying territory that would
probably be reached by the prior user in the natural expan-
sion of his trade, and need pass no judgment upon such a
case." 52 It is hardly an exaggeration to say that the caveat
proved to be more important than the rest of the opinion, as
the federal and state courts were immediately confronted
with the reality of the marketplace where the "neighborhood
theory of trade" had already been supplanted by the goal of
national distribution by every manufacturer, just as the
horse and buggy had been passed over by the automobile. The
Court had solved the legal dilemma of the eastern wholesale
drug company which had built heavily on a trademark for a
cough remedy unaware that a retail druggist in a small city
in the West had a prior claim on that particular trademark.
But it had left to the lower courts the unenviable task of
figuring out whether the junior user of a trademark was
"occupying territory that would probably be reached by the
prior user in the natural expansion of his trade."
THE AFTERMATH OF THE HANOVER DOCTRINE AND ITS
EXTENSION TO FEDERALLY REGISTERED TRADEMARKS
A senior trademark user may claim exclusive territorial
rights in a field or zone of natural expansion of his business,
consistent with the disclaimer language in Hanover.53 Al-
though he cannot prove prior sales penetration or advance
goodwill in a disputed trade area as of the date the junior
user first started using his trademark there, the senior user
50. See text at notes 55-56, infra.
51. See, e.g., Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. California Packing Corp., 63 F.2d
498 (9th Cir. 1933); Chapin-Sacks Mfg. Co. v. Hendler Creamery Co., 254 F. 553
(4th Cir. 1918), discussed at note 65, infra.




may nonetheless assert that the law recognizes an inchoate
right in the elder trader to precedence in territory that is
within his zone of reasonable expansion for the future. Since
the judicial task in such cases is to define this zone of natural
expansion as it existed when the junior user first started
using plaintiff's trademark in the disputed territory, it is no
aid to plaintiff's case that he has in fact entered the disputed
territory as of the date of litigation or that his trademark has
lately become known there. This was impliedly held in a
sequel to the Hanover case in which the plaintiff, whose pre-
decessor first coined the trademark "Rex" for dyspepsia pills,
did not gain any legal advantage by introducing its pills to
the Louisville market a short time before suit was brought,
after 27 years of adverse use in that market area by the
defendant and its predecessor of "Rex" as a trademark for a
blood purifier.5 4
In many of the opinions declaring, as a proferred ground
for relief, that the senior user probably would have reached
the disputed territory in the natural expansion of his busi-
ness, he also introduced proof of advance goodwill or actual
market penetration from a date prior to the infringer's first
use of the trademark. Illustrative of these cases is White
Tower System, Inc. v. White Castle System, 55 in which the
court awarded territory to the senior user although he did not
open a "White Castle" stand in Detroit until a year after the
junior user had established his "White Tower" hamburger
stand there. The fact of the senior user's rapid business ex-
pansion to new locations in the principal cities of the midwest
and north central states in the years immediately preceding
the junior user's first adoption of "White Tower" in Detroit
justified the district court's prediction that Detroit was
within the normal scope of expansion of the senior user's
business at the time the junior user located there. However,
the senior user had also shown the existence of significant
advance goodwill for its trademark in Detroit before the
junior user located there, based on evidence of advertising
and the testimony of Detroit residents. In affirming the
award to the senior user, the appellate court also noted, from
the fact of the location of the senior user's hamburger stands
along arterial highways, that the traveling public carried its
54. See United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
55. 90 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1937).
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reputation far and wide, and by personal recommendation its
good name became an asset in Detroit before the junior user
located there. The decision in such a case can just as well be
explained because a business rival will not be allowed to make
sales by trading upon another's reputation.5 6
No strict necessity exists for estimating the future prob-
able course of the senior user's business when the senior user
has already made sales in the disputed locale before the
junior user got there. Hanover did nothing to disturb the
well-settled rule that very slight use of a technical common
law trademark in a disputed field of trade by its senior user
will preempt any rights to the mark by a junior user in that
area.5 7 Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc.5 8 held that
sales of trademarked goods and some efforts by the senior
user to extend his business to the disputed territory in ad-
vance of any adverse use by the junior user, including mail-
ing of printed catalogues and tentative but never consum-
mated plans to establish a store there, were sufficient to
constitute that territory part of the senior user's exclusive
market area. The statement by the court that the senior user,
which had increased the scope of its business from one store
in San Francisco to five stores encompassing three other west
coast cities and had established a multi-state mail order busi-
ness through which it sold some trademarked goods, would, as
of the date defendant opened its "Sweet 16 Shop" in Salt Lake
City, probably have reached that city in the natural expan-
sion of its business, is therefore a make-weight.
Not infrequently courts presented with the elusive claim
to an expansion zone 59 have focused primary attention on the
bona fides of the junior user, rather than hazard any cock-
sure estimate of the senior trademark user's growth poten-
tial. Perhaps in no other case was the pertinency of the junior
user's bad faith as sharply focused as in that of the celebrated
56. See, e.g., Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348 (9th Cir. 1948);
Chopra v. Kapur, 185 U.S.P.Q. 195 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
57. Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1926),
overrlded in Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 436 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1971), rev'g in
part 299 F. Supp. 572 (E.D. Mo.. 1969),.on remand from 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir.
1967) (different panel), rev'g 255 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
58. Id.
59. See beef & brew, inc. v. Beef & Brew, Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. 531, 535 (D.
Ore. 1974) (noting imprecision of the concept); 3 R. CALLMAN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 76.3(b)(2) (3d ed.
1969) (prediction of probable expansion zone extremely risky).
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Parisian seafood restaurant "Prunier. ' 60 Defendants, doing
business in New York City, confessed they had taken the
name "Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe" and advertised it as
"The Famous French Sea-Food Restaurant" because of the
plaintiff's well-known reputation and goodwill. But plaintiff's
closest branch restaurant was located across the Atlantic
Ocean in London, England, and the only evidence of likeli-
hood of future expansion was that some of their American
patrons had urged them to open a branch restaurant in New
York City and they had a desire to undertake such a venture
at a propitious time. The defendants contended that "what-
ever may be said about their conduct from an ethical point of
view, they [were] doing nothing illegal" since the plaintiff had
no legal right to protection against the use of a trade name
beyond the territory of its exploitation. Noting that the
Hanover doctrine did not apply when the second adopter was
guilty of bad faith, the court said defendant's deliberate ap-
propriation of the name "Prunier" was some evidence of
plaintiff's wide repute, warranting issuance of a preliminary
injunction.
In many other cases courts have looked to the junior
user's good or bad faith as the decisive factor in determining
whether to grant a senior user extraterritorial trademark or
trade name protection.6 1 Although proof of deliberate appro-
priation of a strong technical trademark beyond the territory
of its present exploitation may have probative value in estab-
lishing the boundaries of a potential expansion zone for the
senior trademark user's business, the true reason why the
federal courts have unanimously held, absent any defense of
laches or acquiescence, that such bad faith bars the second
user's claim of concurrent territorial rights is that he is in no
position to claim hardship.
On occasion, the bona fides or unclean hands of the senior
user has played a similarly decisive role. Thus, one court
turned a deaf ear on a senior user whose financial success
was built on fraudulent advertising, notwithstanding that his
60. See Maison Prunier v. Prunier's Restaurant & Cafe, Inc., 159 Misc.
551, 288 N.Y.S. 529 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
61. See, e.g., Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609 (7th
Cir. 1965); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery Corp., 301 F.2d 156 (4th
Cir. 1962); Pike v. Ruby Foo's Den, Inc., 232 F.2d 683 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (remand-
ing for further proceedings); Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 89 F. Supp. 528 (E.D. Mo.
1950), affd, 188 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1951)..
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subsequent sales of "Bond" bread6 2 in the disputed territory
was both a logical and natural step in the expansion of his
business, considering his ownership of a bakery plant in that
territory going back several years before the defendant
adopted the name "Liberty Bond" bread.
The courts have been divided in granting similarly broad
protection in cases involving so-called "weak" trademarks6
or trade names, and in these cases they have employed most
often the legal talisman of good faith with mischievous effect
upon the public interest in consumer identification of a
trademark or trade name. Even though change has been indi-
cated by the enactment of "superior" federal legislation, the
dogma of these precedents enlists present-day adherents. 64
Chapin-Sacks Manufacturing Co. v. Hendler Creamery
Co. 65 must take first prize as an example of the courts' unfor-
tunate use of labels to becloud legally sound results. Having
brushed aside plaintiff senior user's federal registration of
the trademark "The Velvet Kind" for ice cream, a trademark
that the Patent Office found to be only remotely descriptive of
the goods, we are told in the confines of a single opinion: (1)
plaintiff is entitled to exclusive trade name rights in Wash-
ington, D.C., where "The Velvet Kind" is associated in the
public mind with ice cream of its make; (2) the defendant
junior user, who established a large trade in Baltimore, said
territory being "remote" from Washington since "ice cream is
not usually transported from one city to another," is entitled
under Hanover to continue marketing its ice cream there
under that designation; however, and here's the rub, since
the defendant "received the idea" of "The Velvet Kind" as a
brand name from the plaintiff and knowingly took the words
62. See General Baking Co. v. Gorman, 295 F. 168 (D.R.I. 1924), affd, 3
F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 1925). In accord is Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. California
Packing Corp., 63 F.2d 498 (9th Cir. 1933), in which plaintiff senior user was
granted exclusive territorial trademark rights in six western states where it
and its predecessor had been selling "Del Monte" brand coffee for forty years
before defendant entered that product line. Plaintiff was enjoined from mar-
keting "Del Monte" coffee elsewhere, since extension of its trade after 1926
was found to take unjust advantage of the junior user's reputation for its
entire line of "Del Monte" food products.
63. Compare Pabst Brewing Co. v. Decatur Brewing Co., 284 F. 110 (7th
Cir. 1922), with Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Budweiser Malt Products Corp., 295
F. 306 (2d Cir. 1923).
64. See text at notes 216-43, infra.
65. 254 F. 553 (4th Cir. 1918).
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to Baltimore, thus forestalling any extension by plaintiff of
the "supposed" trademark words to Baltimore, both parties
may sell "The Velvet Kind" ice cream there, and the defen-
dant will be required to exercise the "utmost good faith" to
distinguish its ice cream from plaintiff's; (3) although the
plaintiff entered the Annapolis market a few years after the
defendant, he succeeded where the defendant had failed in
associating the words in the public mind with ice cream of his
make, and defendant will be enjoined from selling its ice
cream in that market under the designation "The Velvet
Kind" until it submits to the lower court a "plan of business"
that satisfies the court that defendant's ice cream will not be
confused by the public with plaintiff's ice cream. The upshot
of the court's handiwork presents a narrow vision of what
words may properly serve as a trademark, united to an out-
moded theory of trade coupled with a legal epithet to yield the
incredible result that the consuming public in Baltimore and
Annapolis must rely upon the defendant's good faith and a
"plan of business" to determine whose make of "The Velvet
Kind" ice cream it is buying. Even the most wary purchaser
could not be expected to subject every carton of ice cream he
buys to such meticulous scrutiny as the court's decree en-
visioned.
The "Food Fair" litigation 66 in Massachusetts illustrates
how a court may employ the "good faith" label in the case of a
laudatory trade name to bring about public confusion. The
district court 67 found that when the junior user opened its
"Food Fair" supermarket in Brookline: the senior user, then
the eighth largest retail food chain in the United States, had
a trade name with some secondary meaning in Massachusetts
among perambulating customers; Massachusetts was within
the senior user's expansion zone, and it was reasonable to
conclude that the senior user would establish one or more
Massachusetts supermarkets in "the near future"; the junior
user selected the trade name "Food 'Fair" while fully cogni-
zant of plaintiffs prior use and the expanding character of its
food chain. Nonetheless, since the senior user knew that the
66. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Food Fair, Inc., 83 F. Supp. 445 (D. Mass.
1948), aff'd, 177 F.2d 177 (lst Cir. 1949), and its sequel, Food Center, Inc. v.
Food Fair Stores, Inc., 356 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 1966), vacating and remanding
242 F. Supp. 785 (D. Mass. 1965).




words served a utilitarian function, having been used since
time immemorial to describe extemporary community and
church markets, in addition to any recognitional function
they might perform as distinguishing its supermarkets,
others might share the words without incurring the stigma of
bad faith, and the plaintiff was held entitled to only qualified
injunctive relief against concurrent use of its trade name.68
The junior user might continue to call its supermarket "Food
Fair" provided it also used a distinguishing prefix which, the
court held, would be sufficient to avoid confusion.
The decree was innocuous for almost two decades, during
which time "the unforeseen happened" and the senior user
did not exercise its trade name rights in Massachusetts.6 9 In
the meantime, the junior user, trading as "New England
Food Fair," had opened two additional supermarkets in the
eastern part of the state and had, through the medium of
advertising, achieved public recognition in an undefined area
of eastern Massachusetts. When the possibility of market
entry by the senior user seemed imminent, "New England"
brought suit to prevent the senior user from operating "Food
Fair" supermarkets anywhere in the state, claiming that six-
teen years non-exercise should work a forfeiture of expansion-
ary rights.7 0 "Food Fair" countered with a similar request
for exclusive trade name rights in Massachusetts, pitching its
entire case on the fact that "New England" had been adjudi-
cated an infringer by the prior decree.
The closest the appeals court came to repudiating the
reasoning of the earlier decree, which would have produced
full-scale confusion of trade names through state-wide compe-
tition, was in its statement, "In retrospect both we and the
district court might have been better advised to have set a
time limit for the exercise by Food Fair of trade name rights
in Massachusetts." 7 It left both parties the right to use their
present trade names, despite potential customer confusion.
Outlandish as it might seem, several modern cases involving
68. But cf. Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Lakeland Grocery Corp., 301 F.2d 156
(4th Cir. 1962).
69. See Food Center, Inc. v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 356 F.2d 775, 780 (lst
Cir. 1966).
70. Id. at 779.
71. Id. at 780.
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statutory trademarks have reached similarly harmful re-
sults.7 2
In a unique precedent7 3 involving a strong, picturesque
trademark, the court's obsession with the mala fides of the
defendant's subsequent conduct is the only plausible explana-
tion for the bizarre result it reaches. The defendant, ignorant
of plaintiffs prior use or federal registration of a flying red
horse trademark for gasoline, commenced using a flying white
horse on its service stations in Ohio, territory then remote
from the senior user's field of exploitation. Sometimes the
defendant used a flying red horse, sometimes more than one
horse, but usually it used a flying white horse. About a year
after the defendant began to use the horse symbol, the senior
user entered Ohio under its registered flying red horse
trademark, making extensive use of the trademark. After the
senior user had built up a reputation in Ohio for the flying red
horse, the defendant changed the color of his horse to red.
The senior user than brought suit asking only that the defen-
dant be enjoined from using the symbol of a flying red horse.
Notwithstanding his finding that the defendant had es-
tablished trademark rights in a flying white horse in Ohio,
impliedly conceded by the terms of the plaintiffs bill, the
master recommended that he be enjoined from further use of
any flying horse symbol since horses of different color would
not avoid public confusion. The trial court adopted only part
of the master's recommendation. It agreed that the defendant
could not prevent the senior user from using a flying red
horse in Ohio, an issue which the Supreme Court had left
dangling in the Hanover case but which subsequent en-
lightened rulings had settled in favor of the good faith junior
user.74 It did not agree that the relief for the senior user
72. See text at notes 216-43, infra.
73. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 439 (N.D.
Ohio 1942).
74. See Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Square Deal Market Co., 206 F.2d 482
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Cohn-Goldwater Mfg. Co. v. Wilk Shirt Corp., 147 F.2d 767 (2d
Cir. 1945); Tillman & Bendel, Inc. v. California Packing Corp., 63 F.2d 498 (9th
Cir. 1933); cf. Old Dutch Foods, Inc. v. Dan Dee Pretzel & Potato Chip Co., 477
F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973) (ordering concurrent registration to good faith junior
user for six-state area); Katz Drug Co. v. Katz, 89 F. Supp. 528, 536 (E.D. Mo.
1950) (junior user introduced no evidence to warrant trade name rights in St.




should be broader than requested in its bill, concluding:
"[E]ach party had established rights in a flying horse differ-
ent in color from the other, [and] neither should be expected
to surrender its established rights merely because of some
confusion in the public mind. '75
One wonders why, if the court felt bound to uphold the
right of the junior user to a flying white horse and agreed
with the master's finding that horses of different color would
not avoid public confusion, did it nonetheless adopt the mas-
ter's recommendation that the senior user be permitted to
continue using a flying red horse in Ohio? The reason given
by the master for denying the defendant such affirmative
trademark rights was that its prior use of a flying horse
symbol in Ohio was neither confined to a single horse nor to a
red horse, and had been "intermittent. '76
Review of the natural zone of expansion cases illustrates
the wisdom of Justice Holmes' dictum in Hanover Star Milling
Co. v. Metcalf that the territorial scope of trademarks should
be co-extensive with the bounds of the sovereignty which
recognizes the right. 77 The difficulty with applying his insight
to the resolution of territorial trademark disputes is that
common law trademark rights were held in that very same
case to be co-extensive with established commercial mar-
kets, 78 and these, in turn, do not usually coincide with state
boundaries.7 9 Furthermore, registration of a trademark
under state law did not then and does not now have the effect
of granting statewide rights or eliminating the defense of
good faith in connection with the acquisition of concurrent
territorial rights by a junior user.80 Separate trade areas,
75. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Oil City Refiners, Inc., 44 F. Supp. 439, 440
(N.D. Ohio 1942).
76. Id.
77. 240 U.S. at 426 (Holmes, J., concurring).
78. 240 U.S. 403.
79. See Food Fair Stores v. Square Deal Market Co., 206 F.2d 482, 484-85
(D.C. Cir. 1953); cf. Jacobs v. Iodent Chemical Co., 41 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1930)
(senior user estopped to assert state-wide rights).
80. Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. The Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777, 781-82
(M.D.N.C. 1962); 2 J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§§ 22:3-4 (1973); cf. Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d
838, 844 (9th Cir. 1969) (purported state law no bar to federal statutory
defense of good faith junior user); Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403
F.2d 904, 907-08 (7th Cir. 1968) (good faith junior user's prior state registra-
tion cannot enlarge common law rights vis-a-vis federal registrant). But see
Forzly v. American Distilling Co., 142 F. Supp. 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1956).
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"remote" from each other, have been found to exist within
the same state,8 1 and sometimes even within different sec-
tions of the same city.8 2 Finally, the effect of federal
trademark legislation, at least prior to July 5, 1947, the effec-
tive date of the Lanham Act,83 was no different.
In the 1916 "Bismark" beer case 84 the plaintiff, who had
obtained a certificate of federal registration of its trademark
under the Act of 1905, sued to restrain the defendant from
marketing its beer as "Bismark" beer in New York City, al-
though plaintiff's trade up to the time of suit had been
confined to Baltimore and the West Indies. Reversing the
district judge, who had concluded that each party might con-
tinue to sell "Bismark" beer in its own territory, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held, "The rights which a person
obtains by registration of a trade-mark under those statutes
[the federal Act of 1905] are coterminous with the territory of
the United States." 85 But in 1929, when the United States
Supreme Court came to pass upon the identical statute,
8 6 it
preferred to cite the "Bond Bread '8 7 case, in which the First
Circuit Court of Appeals held that registration under the
federal statute is not such notice as will prevent subsequent
good faith adoption of, a confusingly similar trademark in
intrastate commerce and the acquisition of concurrent ter-
ritorial rights by a good faith junior user.s 8
Respondent, plaintiff below, which had registered the
trademark "Home Brand" under the Act of 1905 for various
grocers' goods which it sold in the Northwest, sued to restrain
the defendant, a printing company, from selling labels dis-
playing the word "Home" for any groceries which the plaintiff
81. E.g., General Baking Co. v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 90 F.2d 241 (7th Cir.
1937).
82. E.g., Pioneer Savings & L. Ass'n v. Pioneer Finance & Thrift Co., 18
Utah 2d 106, 417 P.2d 121 (1966).
83. Pub. L. No. 489, ch. 540, § 46(a), 60 Stat. 427 (approved July 5, 1946), as
amended 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as the "Act of
1946" or the "Lanham Act"].
84. Standard Brewery Co. v. Interboro Brewing Co., 229 F. 543 (2d Cir.
1916).
85. Id. at 544.
86. United States Printing & Lithograph Co. v. Griggs, Cooper & Co., 279
U.S. 156 (1929).
87. General Baking Co. v. Gorman, 295 F. 168 (D.R.I. 1924), afJ"d, 3 F.2d
891 (1st Cir. 1925).
88. Id. at 893-94.
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sold. In affirming a judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding
that the defendant's customers used the labels to effectuate
sales in geographically remote markets, the state supreme
court held, in line with the "Bismark" beer case, that federal
registration of a trademark under the Act of 1905 projected
the rights of the registrant into all states even in advance of
actual trade.8 9 In his United States Supreme Court brief,
counsel for the grocery company advanced the more modest
proposition that a federally registered trademark owner is
entitled to protection in interstate commerce against any in-
fringer when it appears that goods bearing the infringing
labels have moved in the channels of interstate commerce.
The Court did not accept this interpretation.
After opening with the ambiguous statement, "No inter-
ference with interstate or foreign commerce is alleged," 90 the
Court, speaking in reference to the Act of 1905, said,
"[N]either authority nor the plain words of the Act allow a
remedy upon it for infringing a trade mark registered under
it, within the limits of a State and not affecting the commerce
named. More obviously still it does not enlarge common law
rights within a State where the mark has not been used." 91
The Court's opening statement, read in conjunction with the
first underlined words, suggests that its intended holding was
merely that the Act of 1905, enacted under the commerce
power, did not and possibly could not authorize relief against
solely intrastate use of the mark until the registrant had
entered the disputed territory. On the other hand, the second
sentence of the quoted opinion, unless it is surplusage, be-
speaks a decimating holding that registration under the Act
of 1905 adds nothing whatever to the scope of territorial pro-
tection for a trademark owner, which is governed by the Han-
over case. If the latter interpretation is correct, it is surpris-
ing that Hanover is not cited in the opinion. Reference to the
particular page of the "Bond Bread" case cited in the opinion
does not resolve the ambiguity, for that case also covers the
waterfront in its exposition of reasons why federal registra-
tion of the trademark there in question did not affect the
legal result. The decision leaves an inscrutable precedent, but
89. 279 U.S. at 158.
90. Id. at 157.
91. Id. at 158-59 (emphasis added), citing General Baking Co. v. Gorman,
3 F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 1925).
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the judiciary interpreted the case to mean that registration
under the Act of 1905 had no bearing on the resolution of
territorial trademark disputes, which continued to be gov-
erned by the Hanover doctrine. 9
2
Curiously, Justice Holmes delivered the "Home Brand"
opinion. He alone had the perspicacity to recognize the im-
possible task of setting boundaries to an imaginary zone-of
expansion for a trademark owner's business. He suggested
that "questions of penumbra, of shadowy marches where it is
difficult to decide whether the business extends to them"
could be eliminated if the scope of territorial protection for
common law trademarks were determined "upon the funda-
mental consideration of the jurisdiction originating the
right. '9 3 For a man of Holmes' views nothing was radical in
the proposition that Congress might enact a law making fed-
eral registration of a common law trademark the basis for an
exclusive right to use the mark in domestic commerce. His
famous dissent in the Child Labor case, 94 when he parted
company with the majority's effort to divine whether nAtional
legislation in form a regulation of interstate commerce was in
fact an attempt at usurpation of the states' prerogative in
matters of police regulation, dispels any doubt that he may
have regarded so-called substantive trademark legislation as
beyond Congress's lawmaking authority. 95 Yet curiously
Holmes rejected out of hand the state court's interpretation
of the Act of 1905,, even if all he meant to do was to construe
faithfully Congress's intent regarding the effect of registra-
tion on the right of subsequent user. A paramount purpose of
the federal Trademark Act of 1946 was to abrogate the
Court's holding that registration in the Patent Office is not
constructive notice.
92. E.g., Griesedieck W. Brewery Co. v, Peoples Brewing Co., 149 F.2d
1019 (8th Cir. 1945).
93. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. at 426 (Holmes, J.,
concurring).
94. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing).
95. For a discussion of the constitutionality of substantive trademark
legislation, see the influential article by F. Schechter, Fog and Fiction in
Trade-Mark Protection, 36 COLUM. L. REV. 60 (1936), and ABA SECTION OF
PATENT TRADE-MARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, REPORT OF THE SUB-COM-
MITTEE TO THE JOINT MEETING OF THE COMMITTEES ON TRADE-MARK LAW
26-29 (Sept. 27-28, 1937).
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THE LANHAM ACT: NATIONWIDE HORIZONS FOR THE
FEDERAL TRADEMARK REGISTRANT
Edward S. Rogers, 96 first witness called to testify before
Chairman Fritz Lanham's House Subcommittee on Trade-
Marks at its 1938 hearings on the first "Lanham Bill" for
revision of the federal trademark laws,9 7 understated the
truth of the matter when he remarked that the project for
general revision of the trademark laws "is more than a mere
brainstorm and not the happy thought that comes to a man in
the morning when he is shaving."'98 The draft of a new act
which Mr. Rogers personally gave to Representative Lanham
in 193799 and which served as the forerunner of the present
Trademark Act' 00 traced its origin to a standing committee of
the Section of Patent, Trade-Mark, and Copyright Law of the
American Bar Association appointed in 1920, with Mr. Rogers
as its chairman, to study the desirability of revision of the
federal trademark laws. 10 1
Rogers' ABA-sponsored committee prepared a draft of a
new federal trademark bill which was introduced in the 68th
Congress by Senator Richard Ernst.10 2 Ernst's bill, popularly
named "The American Bar Association Trade-Mark Bill,"'10 3
was favorably reported but did not come to a vote. 10 4 In each
succeeding Congress through the 72nd, bills modeled on the
ABA Trade-Mark Bill were introduced and extensive hear-
ings were held to consider them. 0 5 Three of them, introduced
96. On his great contribution to the law of trademarks, including a bib-
liography of his work, see Edward S. Rogers Memorial Edition, 62 Trade-Mark
Rep. 175-265 (1972).
97. Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the
House Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1938) [hereinafter cited as
1938 Hearings].
98. Id. at 13.
99. See Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks,
14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 173, 180 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Rogers].
100. See D. ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL 234-37 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as ROBERT]. See generally Carter, Legislative History of the
New Trade-Mark Act, 36 Trade-Mark Rep. 121 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
Carter]; S. REP. No. 1333 (May 14, 1946), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 79th
Cong.,.2d Sess. 1274, 1277-78.
101. See Rogers at 177-80; 1938 Hearings at 11.
102. See Hearings on S. 2679 Before the Joint Comm. on Patents, 68th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1925) [hereinafter cited as 1925 Hearings].
103. Id.
104. ROBERT at 233.
105. Id. at 233-34; Carter at 121-22.
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by Representative Albert Vestal and collectively known as
the "Vestal Bill," passed the House in three successive Con-
gresses, but none of them ever came to a vote in the Senate,
and the matter of general revision of the federal trademark
laws accordingly came to a halt in the 72nd Congress.1 0 6
In 1934 the situation changed. Prompted by trademark
"protective bureaus" which charged fees for effecting state
registration, a concerted effort was made to secure enactment
in the states of mandatory trademark registration statutes
which purported to make ownership of a trademark and the
right to its exclusive use within an enacting state depend
solely upon registration in that state. 10 7 The prospect that
many states, greedy for revenue, would enact such compul-
sory registration laws alarmed the business community and
provided the impetus for renewed efforts to pass a federal
trademark law'05 that would outlaw such parochial state
legislation. 10 9 Representative Lanham"10 again took up the
fight for general revision of the federal trademark laws in the
75th Congress by introducing Mr. Rogers' draft of a new act.
After more than twenty years of attempted reform, Rep-
resentative Lanham is largely credited with effecting passage
of the present Trademark Act of 1946,111 popularly named the
Lanham Act in his honor.
"[A] sound public policy requires that trade-marks should
receive nationally the greatest protection that can be given
them," stated the Senate report on the Lanham trademark
bill which was signed by the President.' 12 Obviously this pub-
lic policy, which was grounded in the recognition "trade is no
longer local, but is national, ' 1 1 3 could not be achieved so long
as even a brilliant judge might pronounce: "Registration con-
106. Id.
107. Rogers at 178; 1938 Hearings at 11-12, 63. See Hearings on H.R. 4744
Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 195 (1939) [hereinafter cited as 1939 Hearings] (statement by
sponsor of mandatory state trademark movement).
108. 1938 Hearings at 11-12, 63.
109. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970) (intent clause), discussed in 1941 Hearings
at 124-29.
110. 1938 Hearings at 10 (preliminary statement by Fritz Lanham,
chairman).
111. ROBERT at 234-37; Rogers at 180.
112. S. REP. No. 1333 at 1277.
113. Id. See Schechter, Fog and Fiction in Trade-Mark Protection, 36
COLUM. L. REV. 60, 68, 69-70 nn.25-26 (1936).
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fers no right, and limits none; it is a mere procedural advan-
tage, depending upon common-law 'ownership,' which can
exist quite as well without it. ' ' 114 In order to remedy construc-
tions of prior acts that in several instances had obscured and
perverted the original purposes and due to the fact that
"these constructions [had] become so ingrained that the only
way to change them is by legislation," Congress wrote the
present Act. 1 5 Its legislative history and explicit provisions
defining the effect of principal registration in the Patent
Office of a common law trademark upon the right of others to
take up a confusingly similar mark in commerce1 16 left no
doubt that registration both conferred definite rights on the
registrant and limited the rights of others. The Hanover doc-
trine, while still supreme in territorial battles involving un-
registered trademarks, was made to play a decidedly smaller
role in statutory trademark infringement suits founded under
the Act.
One of the many witnesses testifying at the hearings on
the Lanham Act summed up the attitude of its supporters in
the following remarks:
A man comes to my office and wants to adopt and use a
certain trade-mark in New England. I tell him that if he
does not know of the use of that mark in that territory he
can go ahead and adopt it. I tell him that there may be a
registration of the same mark in the Patent Office in
Washington by somebody in Illinois, but if that man is not
using the mark in New England my client may adopt and
use the mark in New England. If he searches the records
in Washington and finds that registration, then he will
know about it and he would not be adopting it in good
faith and he should not adopt it. But if he does not search,
114. Waldes v. International Mfrs.' Agency, Inc., 237 F. 502, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1916) (L. Hand, J.).
115. S. REP. No. 1333 at 1276.
116. The provision of the Lanham Act defining infringement as a "use in
commerce" of any colorable imitation of the registered mark, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(1)(a) (1970), has been liberally construed. See Pure Foods, Inc. v. Mi-
nute Maid Corp., 214 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1954). Whether the Act was intended
to reach such intrastate acts of infringement is left in limbo by the legislative
history. Compare 1941 Hearings at 191 (no) with 1938 Hearings at 55 (Rogers:
only a clairvoyant would know) and 1944 Hearings at 43-44 (Moyer: the bill
leaves the matter in doubt but Congress has authority to regulate the whole
subject matter of trademarks throughout the United States).
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if he just goes ahead and adopts and uses it, then he may
avoid trouble.
That is a bad situation. That is what is occurring at
the present time. People are adopting marks without
searching the records or investigating. This bill will re-
quire a search of the records at Washington. 117
The Act's supporters, echoing views espoused many years
earlier when the Vestal Bill was under consideration,"" saw
the need for nationwide protection. In the words of one trade
witness, speaking on behalf of the National Association of
Manufacturers, "No one knows when he adopts a trade-mark
how extensive his business will become. It may spread over
the whole country, or it may not."1 19 As the testimony about
the client from New England revealed, the Act reconciled the
perceived need for nationwide protection of trademarks with
elemental notions of justice by proclaiming that registration
is notice,1 20 providing for publication for opposition applica-
tions to register trademarks in the "Official Gazette" of the
Patent Office,1 21 and mandating maintenance of a permanent
register where interested parties could discover whether a
117. 1944 Hearings at 130.
118. See Hearings on H.R. 2828 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. 19-28 (1930) [hereinafter cited as 1930 Hearings] (statement by
Robert Watson).
119. 1944 Hearings at 46.
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970). There is dispute whether marks regis-
tered under the 1881 and 1905 Acts became constructive notice on the effec-
tive date of the Lanham Act without republication of such registrations in
the Official Gazette pursuant to section 1062(c) of the Act. Compare E. VAN-
DENBURG, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2.42, at 55 (1959)(no) with R.
DOLE, TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 40, 57
(1965) (yes) and Halliday, Constructive Notice and Concurrent Registration,
38 Trade-Mark Rep. 111, 117 n.36 (1948) (yes). Although the constructive
notice provision of the Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970), also applies to
registrations under the previous Acts, it does not specify when or how such
registrations may become constructive notice. Since a new registration on
the principal register established by the Act of 1946 must be published in the
Official Gazette, 15 U.S.C. § 1062(a) (1970), it is appropriate to exact the same
requirement of old registrations published many years earlier when the law
did not make registration constructive notice of nationwide rights in a mark.
Until such registrations are republished in conformity with § 1062(c), their
only significance with reference to the Act of 1946 should be to preclude the
issuance of a new registration under circumstances likely to cause confusion
of purchasers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970). But cf. Nielsen v. American Oil
Co., 203 F. Supp. 473, 477 (D. Utah 1962) (alternative holding).
121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1062(a), 1063 (1970).
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certain trademark was registered. 122 Accordingly, the princi-
ple of priority did not need to be bounded by artificial territo-
rial limitations in order to assure a measure of fairness to
second comers. The person who first used a trademark could
lay claim to its exclusive use in the whole country by making
a few shipments of trademarked goods into an adjoining
state, a "use in commerce" within the meaning of the Act,'1 23
then applying for registration of his trademark, thereby giv-
ing others notice of his rights.
But the Act did not stop there. In order to protect a
junior user who honestly availed himself of nationwide reg-
istration, and, at the same time, provide an "incentive" to
register all trademarks in Washington, thereby providing as
complete a register of trademarks as was possible to pro-
vide 124 without adopting the controversial requirement of
compulsory deposit, 125 some freedom from attack based on an
earlier common law trademark had to be devised. 126 The in-
contestability provision of the Act, 27 missing from the Vestal
122. 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970); TRADEMARK RULE OF PRAC. 2.27(d), 37 C.F.R.
§ 2.27(d) (1975) (file of registered marks open to public inspection, copies of
records furnished upon payment of fee set by Patent Office). See also Act of
July 5, 1946, ch. 540, § 31, 60 Stat. 437 ($3 statutory fee payable to Patent
Office for certificate that a trademark has not been registered), amended 15
U.S.C. § 1113(b) (1970) (empowering Commissioner of Patents to establish
charges for copies of records, or services furnished by the Patent Office).
123. Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838, 841
(9th Cir. 1969), thus construing the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
124. Hearings on H.R. 82 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong.,
1st Sess. 31-32 (1943) [hereinafter cited as 1943 Hearings] (statement of Wal-
lace Martin).
125. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. §§ 27-32 (1938), containing provisions
for a "search-file" of registered trademarks as well as those in actual use to
be open for public inspection, directed the Commissioner of Patents to include
in such file "any mark ... used for the purpose of identifying merchandise"
deposited in the Patent Office for a fee of $2, and made unlawful the use in
commerce of any such mark unless and until it was deposited in conformity
therewith. Like its predessor contained in the Ernst bill, see S. 2679, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 5 (1924), the purpose of such a provision was to establish a
complete list of all trademarks actually in use in the United States in order to
aid prospective adoptors of a new trademark. See text at note 1, supra. The
basic criticism of any kind of deposit file was that it would defeat the very
purpose of the Lanham bill to give incentive to trademark owners to obtain a
federal registration of their marks. See 1941 Hearings at 233, 258.
126. Martin, Incentives to Register Given by the New Trade-Mark Act, 36
Trade-Mark Rep. 213 (1946).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1970).
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Bill,'12 remedied this defect of earlier federal trademark legis-
lation by immunizing a 5-year-old registration from attack
based on prior use. 129 In this respect, the Act subordinated
the principle of priority to the fact of registration, and did so
to an extent even greater than the Hanover defense of good
faith remote use,'130 relegating the nonregistrant senior user
who slept on his rights to the lowly status of a junior user




Generally speaking, prior registration of a trademark was
made to confer distinct substantive, and not merely proce-
dural, advantages on the registrant, irrespective of whether
use of a confusingly similar trademark by a nonregistrant
user preceded or followed either registration or first use by
the federal registrant and notwithstanding the fact that the
nonregistrant user owned a prior registration under a state
or previous federal trademark registration statute. Two prop-
ositions that result from the Act's explicit provisions capsu-
late the foregoing observations. First, a federal registrant
senior user obtains the exclusive nationwide right to use his
trademark' 32  with only one important exception:133  a
"Hanover defendant"'' 34  who continuously 135  uses the
128. See, e.g., H.R. 2828, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1929), and 1930 Hearings at
79.
129. Prior use is not listed as one of the enumerated grounds upon which
such a registration may be cancelled. 15 U.S.C. § 1064 (1970). The Patent
Office and the courts have acknowledged that this section of the Act shields
five-year-old registrations from attack based on prior use. Compare Dunleavy
Co. v. Koeppel Metal Furn. Corp., 150 U.S.P.Q. 395 (TTAB 1959) and Schwinn
Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973, 982 (M.D. Tenn. 1971),
aij'd, 470 F.2d 975 (6th Cir. 1972), with Blanchard Importing & Distrib. Co. v.
Charles Gilman & Sons, Inc., 353 F.2d 400 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
968 (1966) (contestable registration). But cif Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strick-
land & Co., 150 U.S.P.Q. 688 (TTAB 1966), aJJ'd, 407 F.2d 881, 888-89 (CCPA
1969) (dictum) (suggesting viable ground for attack by such a prior user). For
a discussion of these matters see Fletcher, Incontestability and Constructive
Notice: A Quarter Century of Adjudication, 63 Trade-Mark Rep. 71 (1973).
130. CJ: 1938 Hearings at 88-89 [Edward Rogers noting that immuniza-
tion of five-year-old registrations from attack by a prior user is consistent
with the holding of Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916)].
131. See text at note 141, infra.
132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1057(b), 1065 (1970).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1970).
134. The defense is unavailable to a junior user if the mark was not
adopted "without knowledge of the registrant's prior use." See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1115(b)(5) (1970). Incorporation of this requirement was an application of
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
trademark from a date prior to registration has limited ter-
ritorial rights which are "frozen,"' 1 36 notwithstanding his
prior registration under a state137 or previous federal 13 8
trademark registration law, at the time of registration under
the Act. Second, a federal registrant junior user whose re-
gistration is over 5 years old retains the benefits of nation-
wide rights in the trademark,1 39 limited only by the geograph-
ically restricted rights of the nonregistrant senior user,'
40
the Hanover doctrine to statutory trademarks. See 1941 Hearings at 170, and
text at notes 60-62, supra; Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window
Corp., 160 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1958)
(knowledge of registrant's prior use precludes limited area defense to in-
fringement). A similar requirement is not imposed with respect to trademark
owners whose marks were registered (under previous acts) and used prior to
registration or republication under the Act of 1946 because of the manifest
unfairness of stripping such an older registrant of his trademark rights
unless he can show what the state of knowledge was of people who may now
be deceased. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(6) (1970); 1941 Hearings at 44-46; 1943
Hearings at 20.
135. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1970). See Hot Shoppes, Inc. v. The Hot
Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D.N.C. 1962).
136. Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838 (9th
Cir. 1969); Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1968).
Of course, if the junior user is using the mark in a market in which the senior
user has superior common law rights, for example, in his reputation zone or
an area where his trade was likely to expand, the limited area defense to
suits founded under the Lanham Act will not prevent the senior user from
enjoining such use under the common law. See Comment, The Scope of Ter-
ritorial Protection of Trademarks, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 781, 810 (1970); cf. Hot
Shoppes, Inc. v. The Hot Shoppe, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 777 (M.D.N.C. 1962)
(registrant also lost on alternative common law ground).
137. See Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904 (7th Cir.
1968); 1944 Hearings at 47-48.
138. Until such a previous federal registration is republished in confor-
mity with the Lanham Act it cannot obtain the benefits of qualified immunity
from cancellation, and may therefore be cancelled upon the ground of prior
use of the mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(d) (1970) and text at note 129, supra. If
the prior federal registrant were also senior in use of the mark, the Patent
Office would not grant another a registration under circumstances likely to
cause confusion of purchasers. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970). If it did through
error grant such a registration, then the senior user would be in a position to
cancel it within five years of the date of the second registration. See 1943
Hearings at 47-48; text at note 129, supra.
139. See text at note 129, supra.
140. Assuming compliance with statutory formalities which are condi-
tions precedent to incontestable status under the Act of 1946, e.g., an
affidavit of continuous use must be filed with the Commissioner of Patents
within one year after the trademark has been registered for five years. 15
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whose territory is frozen in precisely the same way as the
Hanover defendant in the first proposition above. 4 1 Indeed,
the incentive to register that is given by the Act is so strong
that the second proposition may apply even to less than
5-year-old registrations, 142 although it is not so strong that a
prior application to register will defeat the right of a senior
user to a nationwide registration, limited, of course, by the
junior user's geographically restricted registration. 43
Happily, the Act has been construed by the courts, in
accordance with the intent of its framers, to affirm the forego-
ing propositions, thus making federal registration of a trade-
mark an extremely effective and just means of resolving the
issue posed at the outset of this article: how best to reconcile
U.S.C. § 1065(3) (1970). If the registration is contestable the junior user will be
able to avail himself of numerous defenses, for example, that the mark was
descriptive of the goods, and will not be limited to the enumerated defenses
made applicable to incontestable registrations. See Comment, The Scope of
Territorial Protection of Trademarks, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 781, 809-10 (1970). If
the five-year-old registration is contestable it will be subject, at least, to the
defenses, including the limited area defense described in the text, made
applicable to incontestable registrations. Forstmann Woolen Corp. v. Murray
Sices Corp., 86 U.S.P.Q. 209, 40 Trade-Mark Rep. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
141. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1970). Since the Act grants a limited area
defense to the nonregistrant junior user vis--vis a senior user who holds an
incontestable registration, the nonregistrant senior user should fare no
worse. But he cannot fare better, for the Act freezes the territory of a
registered (under previous acts) senior trademark owner vis-4-vis a junior
user who holds an incontestable registration. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(6) (1970) and
1943 Hearings at 44 (meaning of the words "used prior to" contained in
section 1115(b)(6)), 49-50 (limited area defense applicable to older registra-
tions).
142. Compare Coastal Chem. Co. v. Dust-A-Way, Inc., 139 U.S.P.Q. 208, 54
Trade-Mark Rep. 325 (Comm'r Pats 1963) (laches of senior trademark user
justifies refusal to cancel prior registrant's nationwide registration in con-
current use proceeding), rev'd, 263 F. Supp. 351. (W.D. Tenn. 1967) with In re
Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466, 477 n.13 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (policy of rewarding
first who federally registers may justify retention by prior registrant of
nationwide trademark rights restricted only by territory of prior user). See
also Schwartz, Concurrent Registration Under the Lanham Act of 1946: What
is the Impact on Section 2(d) of Section 22?, 55 Trade-Mark Rep. 413 (1965).
For a discussion of concurrent registration, a subject which is beyond the
scope of this article, see R. DOLE, JR., TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 74-80 (1965); Comment, The Scope of Territorial Protec-
tion of Trademarks, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 781, 807-18 (1970).
143. See In re Beatrice Foods Co., 429 F.2d 466 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See also
Haas Bros. v. Charles Jacquin et cie, Inc., 143 U.S.P.Q. 36, 54 Trade-Mark




the competing interests-expanded horizons for the first user
as his business grows versus the race to the luckless junior
user who builds up a trade in reasonable ignorance of the
facts-at stake in territorial trademark contests. By granting
the federal registrant exclusive nationwide rights, the Act
has also gone a long way, although not as far as was en-
visioned by its sponsors,'144 to eliminate the problem of con-
current use of trademarks, a source of great confusion and
wonder to the consuming public. We are less likely to en-
counter the phenomenon decried by a spokesman for the Ves-
tal Bill that
when you drive from here [Washington, D.C.] to Chicago,
Denver, Seattle, or California in a week, you could ask for
the same thing and get it from 48 different manufactur-
ers within one day and one night, if you could go that
distance that quickly. 14 5
However, a myopic judicial precedent,146 widely ap-
proved,'147 regarding the ripeness of a request for injunctive
relief under the Act has compromised the statutory goal of
prompt relief against infringement of registered trade-
marks,1 48 thereby ushering in a host of related serious evils,
utterly at odds with the reasonably discernible intent of Con-
gress.
DAWN DONUT COMPANY V. HART'S FOOD STORES, INC.:
DASHED HOPES BY JUDICIAL PROSTRATION OF
FEDERALLY REGISTERED TRADEMARKS
The pathbreaking Dawn Donut case,' 49 construing the
Lanham Act's constructive notice'5 0 and infringement provi-
144. See 1944 Hearings at 45-46 (Henry Savage); Halliday, Constructive
Notice and Concurrent Registration, 38 Trade-Mark Rep. 111 (1948).
145. 1930 Hearings at 53, 54-55 (statement of Karl Fenning).
146. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1959).
147. E.g., Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc., 418 F.2d 838
(9th Cir. 1969); Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614 (3d
Cir. 1969); John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108 (5th Cir. 1966);
Modular Cinemas of America, Inc. v. Mini Cinemas Corp., 348 F. Supp. 578
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
148. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 100.
149. Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir.
1959).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1970).
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sionslM held that the senior user-certificate holder of the
"Dawn" trademark for doughnut mixes had, by virtue of his
earlier renewal registration,'152 a paramount federal right to
exclusive use of the "Dawn" trademark in defendant's retail
market area, but no presently enforceable remedy to enjoin
defendant's retail "Dawn" doughnut sales.
Plaintiff's sales representatives made regular calls upon
bakers in the Rochester area for the purpose of soliciting
orders for its "Dawn" trademarked bags of doughnut mix for
a period of over a decade before defendant started using the
same mark on its baked goods distributed through its retail
grocery chain, also located in the Rochester area. But none of
the Rochester bakers who purchased plaintiff's mix sold
doughnuts to the public under the "Dawn" trademark, and
plaintiff's licensing of the trademark for use in retail sales,
viz. principally to franchisees operating "Dawn Donut Shops,"
was confined to an area not less than 60 miles away from
defendant's trading area for the past 30 years.
Noting the fact it took plaintiff three years to discover
defendant's use of the "Dawn" trademark despite the regular
solicitation of wholesale business by its sales representative,
and taking judicial notice that retail purchasers of baked
goods usually make such purchases reasonably close to their
homes, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned no ac-
tual confusion of purchasers was generated from concurrent
use of the marks at different market levels in the same geo-
151. Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 32(1)(a), 60 Stat. 437, as amended 15
U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1970).
152, Plaintiff's unexpired federal trademark registration, issued in 1927,
was renewed in 1947 pursuant to section 9 of the Act of 1946, see Trademark
Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 9, 60 Stat. 431, as amended 15 U.S.C. 1059(a) (1970),
by filing an application with the Patent Office accompanied by an affidavit of
current use in commerce and the statutory renewal fee. See also Trademark
Act of 1946, ch. 540, § 46(b), 60 Stat. 445, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1970) (note:
existing registrations and rights under prior acts). The court held plaintiff's
renewed registration constituted constructive notice of exclusive nationwide
rights on the effective date of the Lanham Act when the constructive notice
provision became legally operative, Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores,
Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 362 (2d Cir. 1959). See also Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 255 F.
Supp. 771 (E.D. Mo. 1966) (statutory trademark infringement claim failed due
to invalid renewal registration), rev'd on other gnds, 380 F.2d 923 (8th Cir.
1967). Renewal per se should not entitle registrants under prior acts to the
benefits of registration or republication under the Lanham Act for reasons
noted earlier in connection with unexpired registrations under such prior
acts. See note 120, supra.
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graphic area or at the retail level in geographically separate
areas miles apart. However, since the touchstone for the in-
vocation of injunctive relief under § 32(1), clause (a) of the
1946 Act'5 3 is the likelihood of confusion rather than actual
confusion, the court did not end its inquiry there.
Taking what it apparently regarded as a generous view of
the Act's infringement provision, the court ruled that concur-
rent use of marks would give rise to a likelihood of confusion
if expansion by the registrant into the defendant's market is
likely in the normal course of his business. In a footnote, 154
the court remarked that any narrower interpretation would
mean a registrant's common law right to relief under the
Hanover doctrine 5 5 would outstrip his remedy under the Act,
and that this would not comport with Congress's intent to
give a registrant nationwide protection. 5 6
Applying its test, in light of the evidence of plaintiff's
past record of licensing its trademark for retail sales and the
declining nature of this aspect of its business, the court found
no present likelihood that plaintiff would expand its retail use
of the mark into the Rochester area, and, therefore, denied
present right to relief under the Act. However, said the court,
"This is not to say that the defendant has acquired any per-
manent right to use the mark in its trading area. On the
contrary, we hold that because of the effect of the construc-
tive notice provision ... should the plaintiff expand its retail
activities into [the Rochester area], upon a proper application
153. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1970).
154. 267 F.2d at 364 n.4.
155. See text at notes 53-54, supra.
156. A number of federal circuits have adopted a "likelihood of entry"
test of infringement that may make relief under the Act more restricted than
at common law. Compare Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc.,
418 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969) (existence of bona fide prospective franchisees in
defendant's market area establishes impending entry and requisite likelihood
of confusion warranting injunctive relief) with Holiday Inns of America, Inc.
v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 616-19 & 618 n.13 (3d Cir. 1969) (withholding
injunctive relief until commencement of construction of a motel in disputed
market area, notwithstanding (1) actual receipt of franchise applications, (2)
common law reputation zone, and (3) Dawn Donut likelihood of expansion
test of outer limits of statutory infringement satisfied) and Gastown, Inc. of
Delaware v. Gastown, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 626 (D. Conn. 1971) (dynamic senior
registrant of marks for gasoline and filling stations entitled to enjoin concur-
rent user although defendant's nearest filling station 443 miles distant from
plaintiff, in view of proximity of filling stations to interstate super-highways
and testimony of consumer witnesses of actual confusion).
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and showing to the district court, it may enjoin the defen-
dant's use of the mark.' 157 In other words, as one commen-
tator has put it, the defendant who uses another's registered
mark is "living on borrowed time."'158
The Second Circuit's coup in Dawn Donut, containing
only a muted signal to an earlier contrary federal prece-
dent,159 has been widely followed without further reflection,
and, from at least one scholarly quarter, has been praised as
a reasonable interpretation of the Act which allows a "period
of grace to effect an orderly transition to a new mark.
1 60
Even if a prudent businessman would not take Dawn Donut
as "an invitation to gamble that the plaintiff would never be
in a position to exercise his superior rights ... [because of] the
ever-present possibility that the registered mark could be
assigned to a more dynamic firm or licensed to a local user in
defendant's territory,"'1 6 ' the pernicious effects of the holding
would only be mitigated, not eliminated. In fact, those using
another's registered trademark sometimes stubbornly resist
a demand letter based on an erroneous view of their legal
rights.1 62 Moreover, as registrant "might conclude that it
would answer his purpose to let the defendant go on selling
four or five years, and at the end of that time call him to an
account of profits as if he were the [registrant's] salesman,' '1 63
in which case he would do nothing to apprise the junior user
of his registration until he was ready to strike. As long as the
registrant remained outside the junior user's market area, he
157. 267 F.2d at 360.
158. 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION at 228
(1973).
159. Sterling Brewing, Inc. v. Cold Spring Brewing Corp., 100 F. Supp.
412 (D. Mass. 1951) (enjoining defendant junior user from use of republished
mark in New England area despite finding that plaintiffs common law ter-
ritorial rights limited to the mid-west), modified on rehearing, 92 U.S.P.Q. 37
(D. Mass. 1952) (excluding intrastate use of mark from operation of injunc-
tion).
160. R. DOLE, JR., TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS at 50 (1965); cf. Developments in the Law-Trade-Marks and
Unfair Competition, 68 HARV. L. REV. 814, 859 (1955). But see Derenberg, The
Twelfth Year of Administration of the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 49
Trade-Mark Rep. 1019, 1070-72 (1959).
161. R. DOLE, JR., TERRITORIAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS AND THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 50 (1965).
162. See, e.g., John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 114 n.10
(5th Cir. 1966).
163. Gilka v. Mahalovitch, 50 F. 427, 428 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1892).
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
would have no right to sue for infringement, and, as one
judge noted, "To hold plaintiffs guilty of laches for failing to
institute a suit which the courts have held would have been
futile, would produce a ludicrous result.'1 64
While the Second Circuit's factual conclusions are unex-
ceptionable, its reading of the statute, uninformed by any
consideration of the legislative history or its own landmark
precedents, should appeal only to those persons who possess,
at best, a perfunctory understanding of trademarks. The
court reasons from the faulty premise that the statutory lan-
guage of § 32(1), clause (a)165 was an invitation by Congress
for the courts, in cases involving competing goods or services
in a different trade territory, to forecast whether the goods or
services of the parties would have common purchasers or
users in the reasonably foreseeable future, rather than an
attempt to substitute the "Aunt Jemima doctrine"'1 66 for the
"same descriptive properties" language of the Act of 1905167
which had given the courts so much trouble and outlived its
time.168
Section 16 of the Act of 1905169 imposed liability for in-
fringement only on persons who should "reproduce, counter-
feit, copy, or colorably imitate" the registered mark and "affix
the same to merchandise of substantially the same descriptive
properties as those set forth in the registration" (emphasis
added). Section 5(b), 170 defining what marks might be regis-
tered, forbade the registration of any trademark "which so
nearly resemble[d] a registered or known trade-mark owned
and in use by another and appropriated to merchandise of the
164. Aluminum Fabricating Co. v. Season-All Window Corp., 160 F. Supp.
41, 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1958).
165. See.15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1970). The 1962 amendment to subsection
(1) of section 32, see Act of October 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, § 17, 76 Stat.
773 [codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1970)], did not materially change the
infringement provision in regard to the matter under consideration in the
text. See S. REP. No. 2107 (Sept. 18, 1962), U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2844, 2850-51.
166. From Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co., 247 F. 407 (2d Cir.
1917) (trademark protection not limited to precisely the same goods), cert.
denied, 245 U.S. 672 (1918).
167. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 728.
168. See Lunsford, Trademark Infringement and Confusion of Source:
Need for Supreme Court Action, 35 VA. L. REV. 214 (1949).
169. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 16, 33 Stat. 728.
170. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5(b), 33 Stat. 725 (first proviso).
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same descriptive properties as to be likely to cause confusion
or mistake in the mind of the public or to deceive purchasers."
The parallel § 32(1), clause (a) of the Lanham Act, 1 71 begin-
ning at its second sentence, was practically the same, except
that it eliminated the language that one must "affix" the
registered mark to "merchandise of substantially the same
descriptive properties," and permitted a broad recovery for a
use "likely to cause confusion or mistake or to deceive pur-
chasers as to the source of origin"; its parallel registration §
2(d)1 72 was similarly extended to forbid registration when the
mark sought to be registered would be "likely, when applied
to the goods of the applicant, to cause confusion or mistake or
to deceive purchasers." As Judge Learned Hand, who un-
derstood as well as -anyone the development of the modern
law relating to the enlarged scope of protection for trade-
marks, said, "It is quite enough to explain the change of
diction in the Lanham Act that Congress wished to do no
more than clear up this doubt [whether the "Aunt Jemima
doctrine" could be applied in a case decided under the restric-
tive "same descriptive properties" language of § 16 of the Act
of 19051' 73 -if indeed it was not more than a doubt-and make
the protection of the new right coextensive with the law of
unfair competition as it was in 1946. ...
The only discussion in the hearings on the Lanham Act
relative to the phraseology of § 32(1), clause (a) indicates that
Congress's sole concern and preoccupation was to rid the
statutory test of any artificial limitation on the class of goods
or services in connection with which a registered mark would
be protected when likelihood of confusion of purchasers was
proved to exist, thus mirroring perfectly Judge Hand's in-
terpretation. Not a word of testimony in regard to the in-
fringement provision lends support to the Second Circuit's
Dawn Donut rule.
Testifying at the first round of hearings on trademark
reform before Fritz Lanham's House Subcommittee on Trade-
Marks, Edward S. Rogers commented upon an early version
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (1970).
172. See Trademark Act of July 5, 1946, ch. 5,10, § 2(d), 60 Stat. 428, as
amended 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (1970).
173. See Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1928).
174. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Johnson, 175 F.2d 176, 179 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949); Note, Unfair Competition From Non-Competing
Goods, 2 WYO. L.J. 66 (1948).
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of the infringement provision which defined as an act of in-
fringement:
to use in commerce any such copy, counterfeit, or color-
able imitation [of a registered trademark] upon or in con-
nection with the merchandise set forth in the certificate
or registration or merchandise of such a character that the
use of the copy, counterfeit, or colorable imitation in con-
nection therewith is likely to cause confusion or mistake or
to deceive purchasers.17
5
His testimony was as follows:
The second paragraph of the sentence [just quoted]
covers the use of the goods, and there is a change in
existing law in that connection. Existing law [referring to
§ 16 of the Act of 1905] prohibits the use of deceptive
similar trade-marks on goods-now, may I particularly
call your attention to this language-of substantially the
same descriptive properties of the goods mentioned in the
certificate of registration.
Now the phrase "goods of substantially the same de-
scriptive properties" must have been evolved by a vir-
tuoso in vagueness ...
Recently, the courts . . . have held that goods are of
the same descriptive properties if they fit into a recog-
nized trade class, and they have gone to the extent of
holding that groceries, for example, olive oil, on the one
hand, and coffee, on the other, are goods of the same
descriptive properties and, incidentally, they always
have, and the present law is that goods are the same in
legal contemplation if the use of the same mark on the
two varieties would suggest to the consumer that they
came from the same place, or were made by the same
concern ...
That seems to all of us to be a sensible interpretation
and we have scrupulously avoided the use of this "bug-
bear" phraseology, "goods of the same descriptive proper-
ties," and have tried to put it in this way .... 176
175. H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. § 1 (1938) (emphasis added) (incorpo-
rated by reference in section 34(a) of the same bill, setting forth remedies for
infringement).
176. 1938 Hearings at 52.
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Such clear evidence of lack of support for the Dawn Donut
rule in the infringement provision, which also states an in-
fringer "shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for
the remedies hereinafter provided,"' 77 should be sufficient to
turn the tide of judicial precedent, unless the rule finds sup-
port in some other provision of the Lanham Act, or serves
some just purpose. Some courts 178 have apparently taken ref-
uge in the first sentence of the remedies provision, § 34,179
stating that the courts shall have power to grant injunctions
to prevent the violation of any right of a registrant "accord-
ing to the principles of equity and upon such terms as the
court may deem reasonable." But the first sentence of § 34 is
taken almost verbatim from the Act of 1905,180 and its inclu-
sion in the Act apparently was considered too trivial to merit
any discussion in Congress. Moreover, violation of a statutory
right carries its own indicia of irreparable injury,1 81 and when
a court stays its hand until such time as the registrant can
show impending entry into a junior user's market area, it is
acting contrary to the public interest.
Unfortunately, no provision in the Lanham Act corre-
sponds to § 18(h) of the Ernst Bill 8 2 which granted injunc-
tive relief coextensive with the United States. Nor is there a
similar report of a prestigious patent law association, 8 3
which, commenting upon § 18(h) stated:
Under section 16 of the act of 1905 it appears that in-
fringement of a registered trade-mark in interstate or
foreign commerce is actionable if it occurs anywhere in
the United States, and irrespective of whether the regis-
trant's trade has extended into the territory in which the
177. Trademark Act of July 5, 1946, § 32, as amended by 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)
(1970),Jbrmerly ch. 540, § 32(1), 60 Stat. 437-38. The present version quoted in
the text is virtually identical to the former version in the particular noted.
178. E.g., Holiday Inns of America, Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618
(3d Cir. 1969).
179. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1970).
180. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 19, 33 Stat. 729.
181. Cf. Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 894-95 (5th Cir.
1970) 4irreparable injury presumed from fact of statutory violation of Title
VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act).
182. S. 2679, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. § 18(h) (1924).
183. 1925 Hearings at 93 (New York Patent Law Association, Report of
the Committee on Trade-Mark Legislation on the American Bar Association's
Proposed Federal Trade-Mark Bill).
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defendant's trade occurs. Section 18(h) of the bill is
equally broad. 18
Moreover, one searches in vain the legislative hearings
preceding the Act's passage for any explicit resolution of the
territorial extent problem. Indeed, one gathers the distinct
impression from the record made at the hearings on the Act
that one of its chief supporters artfully dodged the issue of
immediate availability of injunctive relief in "remote" terri-
tory in the face of stiff, unrelenting opposition to any change
in then existing law. One of the Lanham bill's opponents
propounded the direct question, "Suppose I use a mark only
within the District of Columbia, and I secure registration.
Suppose someone wants to use that same mark in some town
in Oregon or California, may I enjoin that use under this
section?" 185 Mr. Rogers declined to answer, stating: "That is
something I would like to discuss in its order when we get to
the question of notice .... "11s6
Despite Mr. Rogers' equivocation with respect to the
practical consequences of nationwide registration, the vivid
critique made at the hearings in regard to the possible unjust
operation of one of the Act's related provisions highlights the
strong policy reasons against the Dawn Donut rule. At sev-
eral points in the hearings criticism was directed to the man-
ner in which it was feared "notice" registration restricted
pre-existing common law concurrent trademark rights. The
debate focused principally on the so-called "mini-Hanover" or
"limited area" defense, now embodied in § 33(b)(5) of the
184. Id. at 100 (footnotes omitted). Trademark hearings on the Vestal
Bill, which contained a similarly worded provision, see H.R. 2828, 71st Cong.,
2d Sess. § 18-H (1930), revealed considerable contrariety of views on whether
the section was intended to enlarge the scope of territorial trademark protec-
tion beyond that afforded by the common law. Compare 1930 Hearings at 19,
24, 27-28 (statement by Robert Watson) (purpose of bill is to nationalize
trademark ownership, thus flying in the face of U.S. Supreme Court rulings)
and 1930 Hearings at 72, 76 (statement of A.C. Paul) (bill will enable regis-
trant to enjoin junior user in remote section of interstate commerce) with
1930 Hearings at 49-51 (Mr. Frazer) (bill is merely declaratory of common law,
quoting other sections of bill which indeed cast doubt on efficacy of section
18-H) and 1930 Hearings at 53-55 (statement of Karl Fenning) (registration
should confer exclusive nationwide rights, and bill should be amended to
outlaw use in commerce of registered trademarks adopted after the date of
registration).
185. 1938 Hearings at 30 (statement of Chauncey Carter).
186. Id. at 69.
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Act, 87 which qualifies the registrant's exclusive nationwide
right to use the mark if the junior user can establish that he
adopted the mark without knowledge of the prior use and
has continuously used it from a date prior to registration.
On the one hand, the Act's critics charged that the lim-
ited area defense could be used only defensively as a shield
against a charge of infringement, not offensively as a sword
to exclude the federal registrant from the good faith junior
user's market area.188 The Act would then produce a double-
barrelled harmful result: unfairness to the good faith junior
user by enabling the federal registrant to obtain a free ride
on the reputation that the junior user had earned for the
mark and making him the guardian of that reputation, and
deception of the purchasing public by permitting the regis-
trant to sell his goods, possibly inferior, under the identical
trademark that had come to signify the junior user's prod-
uct.
1 8 9
On the other hand, an attack was made on the limited
area proviso. 90 Mounting their strongest possible case, the
critics claimed that the incontestability feature of the Act,
which immunizes a 5-year-old registration from cancellation
based on an earlier common law trademark,19 1 coupled with
the limited area proviso, which likewise "freezes" the terri-
tory of an unregistered common law senior user to the area in
which he has used the mark prior to the date of registra-
tion, 192 unduly penalized the small businessman who had
been using his trademark for years without any claims of
adverse user.1 9 3 His failure to avail himself of registration
187. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) (1970) (in part): "That the mark whose use ... is
charged as an infringement was adopted without knowledge of the regis-
trant's prior use and has been continuously used by him or those in privity
with him from a date prior to registration of the mark under this Act....
Provided, however, that this defense ... shall apply only for the area in which
such continuous prior use is proved."
188. 1939 Hearings at 37 (Stewart Whitman); 1941 Hearings at 181-83
(Louis Robertson).
189. Id.
190. See text of proviso at note 187, supra; 1944 Hearings at 47 (Senate
chairman Claude Pepper); 1941 Hearings at 1.81-83, 186 (Louis Robertson),
168-69, 192-95 (Milton Handler criticizing limited area proviso as applied to
contests involving registrants under previous federal acts when one party is
first to republish his trademark under the Lanham Act).
191. See text at note 129, supra.
192. See text at note 141, supra.
193. See 1941 Hearings at 181-83, 186 (Louis Robertson), 168-69 (Milton
Handler); 1939 Hearings at 37.
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under the Act for five years or, at least, to keep a careful
watch on the Official Gazette or the trade, in case his
trademark were claimed by another, would, entitle the five-
year registrant to take over any new territory developed by
the senior user after the registration date. 194 The critics also
indicted the proviso for being only a "shield": once the regis-
trant effected a take-over the public would be deceived into
purchasing the registrant's spurious goods for the genuine
article. Appealing to emotion, the critics said, "It may be a
matter of health; it may be a sleeping tablet, which the public
is accustomed to under one strength, and when incontestabil-
ity takes over, a sleeping pill perhaps two or three times the
strength may come in under the same name.' '1 95
Despite the strong appeal of such arguments, Congress
was persuaded that the limited concessions that the Act
makes to common law trademark users who fail to take ad-
vantage of registration are dictated by the need for an effec-
tive federal law. "I understand," said Chairman Lanham,
"but we have got to have the reverse of the general maxim
that ignorance of the law is no excuse, where the law is
readily available to the man.' 196 However, Congress rejected
the compulsory deposit proposal of more "radical" reformers
who would have limited common law trademark rights much
more than the Act does, despite the quite forceful presenta-
tion they made favoring such a provision. 197
Congress's preference for a trademark law with teeth in it
does not render irrelevant the critique of notice registration.
Even the loser's arguments may sometimes supply evidence
of shared concerns, thus furnishing a persuasive rationale for
applying an ambiguous statutory provision in one way rather
than another. For example, the courts have held sensibly that
a good faith junior user may exclude a Lanham Act regis-
194. Id.
195. 1941 Hearings at 183.
196. Id. at 185.
197. A persuasive case was made for compulsory deposit of all common
law trademarks at hearings held to consider H.R. 5461. See 1941 Hearings at
75-77 (statement of Hugo Mock). But chairman Lanham expressed doubt
regarding the constitutionality of such a mandatory provision, id. at 80, and
even the proposed permissive deposit provision embodied in section 29 of the
committee print containing amendments to H.R. 5461 approved by the ABA
Committee on Trade-Mark Legislation faced rather heavy sledding. Id. at 36,
233-34 (Wallace H. Martin), 257-58 (Walter Derenberg). Contra, id. at 213-14.
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trant from his pre-existing market area despite the fact that §
33(b)(5) is cast as a "defense" and the legislative history is
unauthoritative. 198 How could the courts have done other-
wise, especially in light of the Act's twofold goal "to protect
the public so that it may be confident that, in purchasing a
product bearing a trade-mark which it favorably knows, it
will get the product which it asks for and wants to get," and
to protect "the owner of a trade-mark . . . in his investment
from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats?" 199
By the same token, the courts should recognize that the
stated goal of the Act's sponsors to afford "prompt" relief
against infringement is related functionally to accomplish-
ment of these other goals. Justice delayed is justice denied.
Congress accorded courts vested with jurisdiction of civil ac-
tions arising under the Act leeway to grant injunctions or to
make an award of profits and damages 20 0 "according to the
principles of equity" precisely to achieve these goals under
varying factual situations revealed by trademark litigation.
Courts should hold that a registrant who knowingly waits
in ambush for an ignorant infringer's business to grow and
prosper under the registered trademark has not availed him-
self of the prompt relief against infringement to which the
Act entitles him. His knowing laches is an equitable ground
for denying him injunctive relief.20 1 Moreover, the court,
which is expressly given broad power over registrations,
20 2
should sustain the unknowing infringer's counterclaim re-
questing a territorial decree which awards him concurrent
trademark rights in the separate market area that the plain-
tiff has unconscionably permitted him to develop, albeit the
198. See Burger King of Florida, Inc. v. Hoots, 403 F.2d 904, 909 (7th Cir.
1968); Mister Donut of America, Inc. v. Mr. Donut, Inc. (unreported case), 2
J.T. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 26.18 at 237
(1973), on remand fom 418 F.2d 838 (9th Cir. 1969); cf. Old Dutch Foods, Inc.
v. Dan Dee Pretzel & Potato Chip Co., 477 F.2d 150, 154 n,3 (6th Cir. 1973)
(dictum).
199. S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. at 1274.
200. 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1970).
201. See text at notes 32-35, 40-41, supra; Haviland & Co. v. Johann
Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); cf. Alfred
Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Dunhill Tailored Clothes, Inc., 293 F.2d 685
(C.C.P.A. 1961) (acquiescence); 1941 Hearings at 190-91 (registrant must act
diligently, law of acquiescence preserved).




defendant has either expanded his business 20 3 or adopted the
registered trademark with constructive notice of plaintiff s
superior rights.20 4 The decree may also appropriately contain
an order, certified to the Commissioner of Patents, directing
him to rectify the register by partially cancelling plaintiffs
nationwide registration and issuing a concurrent but territo-
rially limited registration to the defendant. 20 5 Indeed, the
courts may dispense with proof that the original registrant
had actual knowledge of the defendant's infringing use. His
failure to police the trade in order to safeguard his rights in
appendant markets might be held a sufficient bar to relief
with corresponding relief for the defendant, 20 6 just as failure
to police the trade adequately may result in only a qualified
right to the enjoyment of a trademark,20 7 or possibly its total
forfeiture 20 8 if the mark has become an appellation for the
article in connection with which it is used.20 9
Yet, the weird logic of Dawn Donut counsels inaction by
the regist'rant and logically precludes the application of the
equitable defense of laches. 210 The statutory "penalty" for
failure to register, indispensable for effective trademark
legislation, has been transformed judicially into a policy of
overkill. The consuming public, an innocent bystander that
knows not of such judicial legerdemain, may be duped by the
registrant's use of the familiar trademark into getting what it
does not want.
The second goal of the statute, to protect the investment
of the trademark registrant from misappropriation by trade
203. Cy. Avon Shoe Co. v. David Crystal, Inc., 279 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1960)
(use of registered mark on related goods).
204. See Halliday, Constructive Notice and Concurrent Registration, 38
Trade-Mark Rep. 111, 124 (1948); c: Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Dunhill
Tailored Clothes, Inc., 293 F.2d 685 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
205. Cf. Old Dutch Foods, Inc. v. Dan Dee Pretzel & Potato Chip Co., 477
F.2d 150 (6th Cir. 1973) (good faith junior user).
206. See text at note 41, supra.
207. See, e.g., Havana Cigar & Tobacco Factories Ltd. v. Oddenino, 130
L.T.R. (n.s.) 428 (C.A. 1923); Dupont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85
F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1936).
208. See, e.g., McKesson & Robbins, Inc. v. Charles H. Phillips Chemical
Co., 53 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir.), modified, 53 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied,
285 U.S. 552 (1932) ("Milk of Magnesia").
209. See generally Diamond, How to Use a Trademark Properly, 61
Trade-Mark Rep. 431 (1971).
210. See text at note 164, supra.
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"pirates and cheats," is also sacrificed on the altar of the
Dawn Donut rule. The honest registrant who vigilantly
polices the trade in order that his trademark will not be
tarnished by an infringer's shoddy business practices is po-
litely turned out of court "without prejudice"! Immediately
he learns another is using a confusing mark in appendant
territory; he bids his attorney draft a demand letter telling
the latecomer he is infringing a registered trademark and
must cease and desist forthwith. Latecomer's attorney replies
that his client has priority of use of the mark in stated terri-
tory and therefore has superior rights there. Registrant then
brings an injunction suit. The court, in goose-step reliance
upon the Dawn Donut rule, solemnly pronounces that the
defendant can acquire no superior right in plaintiff's regis-
tered trademark, and even commends plaintiff's attorney for
filing suit prematurely in the face of such obstinancy by de-
fendant's lawyer.2 11 But plaintiffs complaint is dismissed as
unripe. The dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiffs right
to bring another suit based upon "subsequently occurring
events which may make it likely that the uses of the respec-
tive marks . . . are likely to cause confusion, deception or
mistake." '2 12 Until subsequent events unfold, plaintiff is told
he has not suffered any harm that is worthy of equitable
relief.
Plaintiffs right to bring fresh suit when subsequent
events unfold is small consolation. He must expand his busi-
ness prematurely to defendant's field of operations as the
price for immediate equitable relief. Otherwise, he must
forego such relief; meanwhile the defendant, possibly unde-
terred by the court's solemn pronouncement as would be any
commercial racketeer, 213 gives plaintiffs trademark a dirty
name. No registered trademark owner can feel secure in the
face of the Dawn Donut rule. 214 What is more, the rule serves
no useful purpose since the court can in any event effectively
fashion its decree to permit the defendant a reasonable
amount of time to dispose of goods on hand and to make a
211. See John R. Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 114 n.10 (5th
Cir. 1966).
212. Id. at 116.
213. See generally Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products Mfg.
Co., 349 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966) (accounting
necessary to render infringement by non-competitor unprofitable).
214. See ROBERT at 129-30.
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transition to a new trademark. 2 15 If the courts will not over-
rule the Dawn Donut rule, Congress must do so.
JUDICIAL EXTENSION OF DAWN DONUT: WATERED-DOWN
PROTECTION FOR FEDERALLY REGISTERED
SECONDARY MEANING TRADEMARKS
Effective relief against infringement of federally regis-
tered trademarks is also jeopardized by judicial extension of
the Dawn Donut test of infringement to secondary meaning
trademarks registered under the five-year clause of § 2(f),216
although the legal issues raised by this line of cases are far
from being settled. Cases in three circuits of the federal
courts of appeals, reverting to common law principles govern-
ing the territorial scope of protection for trade names in clear
derogation of the Act's purpose to assimilate common law
trade names and trademarks, have held that injunctive relief
is not available to protect a registered secondary meaning
trademark in geographic areas where the mark has not yet
acquired secondary meaning.217
The result in two of these cases, in which there was
neither actual market competition between the parties nor
present likelihood of expansion by the federal registrant
senior user into the defendant's trade territory, 218 would have
been the same under Dawn Donut's different. market limita-
tion. But the ratio of all three is an extension of Dawn Donut,
since it calls for exoneration of a defendant who takes up a
registered mark and uses it upon competing goods in the
same market area as that in which the registrant is using it.
Injunctive relief is withheld upon the ground that until a
registered secondary meaning mark has gained public recog-
nition as the registrant's commercial signature (secondary
meaning) in the particular locale where he seeks to enjoin
concurrent use, no likelihood of confusion, ergo infringement,
is created by such use. Once again the little phrase "likely to
215. E.g., W.E. Bassett Co. v. Revlon Inc., 354 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1966).
216. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1970).
217. See National Automobile Club v. National Automobile Club, Inc., 365
F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aX f'd mein., 502 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1974); Flavor
Corp. of America v. Kemin Industries, Inc., 493 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1974);
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F.2d 88.(6th Cir. 1959).
218. National Automobile Club v. National Automobile Club, Inc., 365 F.
Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264
F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1959).
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cause confusion," Achilles' heel of the Lanham Act, has been
made the vehicle for an outmoded doctrine of trademark pro-
tection.
In Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co.,219
which launched the theory of watered-down protection for
registered secondary meaning trademarks, plaintiff, owner of
a contestable registration of the term "Bavarian's" as a
trademark for beer, could get only a territorially limited in-
junction restraining defendant's use of "Busch Bavarian"
beer, restricted to the Cincinnati trade area. With respect to
this locale, the district court found plaintiff had carried his
burden of proving that the "Bavarian's" mark, though origi-
nally geographically descriptive, had acquired through his
long and exclusive use secondary meaning denoting beer
made by him. 220 The court of appeals, whose opinion preceded
Dawn Donut by a few months, skirted plaintiff's argument,
raised for the first time in his brief on appeal,2 21 that the
Lanham Act gave his registration nationwide scope under
§ 22, by holding that the Act only protects a § 2(f) mark in
territorial markets where it has acquired a secondary mean-
ing. The holding, propped up by a misapplication of the non-
denominative use defense,222 is wrought by fitting the ele-
ments of a common law action for unfair competition in the
use of a trade name into the infringement provision where
they do not belong.
However, the Sixth Circuit achieved by indirection a just
result, one more in keeping with appropriate statutory pre-
requisites for nationwide registration of secondary meaning
marks than the Patent Office's underlying disposition of
plaintiff's § 2(f) application. The defendant overstated his case
when he counterclaimed for total cancellation of plaintiff's
registration upon the ground of complete absence of secon-
dary meaning for the term "Bavarian's," which he claimed
was the designation for a kind or type of beer. 223 The Court of
219. 264 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1959).
220. Bavarian Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 210, 216
(S.D. Ohio 1957).
221. R. Bonynge, The Effect of Registration in Trademark Litigation, 50
Trade-Mark Rep. 902, 909 (1960) (counsel for defendant, Anheuser-Busch,
Inc.).
. 222. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian Brewing Co., 264 F.2d 88, 92-93
(6th Cir. 1959).
223. 150 F. Supp. at 213-14.
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Appeals, in affirming dismissal of the counterclaim, relied
upon the finding of the Patent Office that the mark had ac-
quired secondary meaning in plaintiff's limited distribution
area, whatever connotation the term "Bavarian's" might
have in other territory.224 But plaintiffs less than five-year-
old nationwide registration for the "Bavarian's" trademark
was invalidly issued because of inadequate evidence that the
mark had become distinctive over a sufficiently widespread
area of the United States, and the court should have ordered
its partial cancellation upon this ground. 225 There was virtual
consensus among the Lanham Act's supporters that the evi-
dence supporting an application to register a secondary
meaning mark should show that the mark had acquired sec-
ondary meaning generally throughout the country, 226 but, un-
fortunately, such "matters of procedure" were left to the ad-
ministrative wisdom of the Commissioner of Patents with no
method provided in the statute, apart from the five-year
clause, for determining when such a mark "has become dis-
tinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce. '227
Although the reasoning of the court's holding, which in-
vited piecemeal adjudication of plaintiff's territorial rights, is
wholly irreconcilable with its recognition of a Validly issued
nationwide registration, the result of the decision gave plain-
tiff what he deserved by leaving him, in practical effect, with
a territorially restricted registration confined to his distribu-
tion area. Ironically, a related case decided several years
later, foreshadowed by the instant controversy, attributed
absolute finality to the Sixth Circuit holding.
Plaintiff, the dynamic successor in interest to the "Bavar-
ian's" beer trademark, asked a federal district court in
Florida to enjoin the instant defendant's competing sales of
"Busch Bavarian" beer sold in common market areas with
224. 264 F.2d at 90-91.
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (1970) (power of court over registrations). Sec-
tion 1(a)(1) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (1970) (proviso), makes
express provision for territorially restricted applications to register trade-
marks, and there does not appear any reason why local secondary meaning
trademarks, covering a limited portion of the United States, should be
excluded from its limited benefits. See 4 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION,
TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 98.4(a) at 666 & n.46 (3d ed. 1970).
226. 1938 Hearings at 104-09.
227. Hancock, Evidence Under Sec. 2(f) of the Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 42




plaintiffs "Bavarian's Select" beer.228 The district court, ap-
plying the doctrine of res judicata, held that the right of
defendant to use the word "Bavarian" as part of its trade-
mark in any area of the United States not covered by the
Sixth Circuit injunction, absent proof that the term "Bava-
rian's" or "Bavarian's Select" had acquired secondary mean-
ing in the area where the registrant or his privy sought an
injunction, had been settled in defendant's favor by the ear-
lier litigation. Since the plaintiff had not submitted any evi-
dence that "Bavarian's" or "Bavarian's Select" had acquired
such secondary meaning denoting beer made by it in any of
the market areas where it sought an injunction, the court
denied it any relief. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, which
affirmed the district court judgment, the court quixotically
stated that the right of defendant to use its "Busch Bava-
rian" trademark anywhere outside the Cincinnati trade area
had been settled for all time in defendant's favor by the Sixth
Circuit holding.22
9
Almost fifteen years after the Bavarian Brewing case was
decided, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an apparent
steady retreat from its earlier enlightened stand favoring
wide protection of trademarks 230 that surfaced a few years
previously in a topsy-turvy nonstatutory infringement suit 231
adopted its disparate approach to registered secondary mean-
ing trademarks. 232 The court held that plaintiff, owner of an
incontestable federal registration for the term "Pestlur" as a
trademark for rat killer flavor additive, apparently obtained
under § 2(f),233 could not enjoin defendant's sales of the same
product under the brand name "Rat Lure" in any of 38
"Lanham Act states" concededly belonging to plaintiff be-
cause of his "notice" registration, unless and until his regis-
tered trademark acquired secondary meaning in any of them.
In a footnote, which calls to mind the horrors of the post-
228. International Breweries, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 230 F. Supp.
662 (M.D. Fla. 1964), affd, 364 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1966).
229. Id. at 264.
230. Sweet Sixteen Co. v. Sweet "16" Shop, Inc., 15 F.2d 920 (8th Cir.
1920).
231. Sweetarts v. Sunline, Inc., 436 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1971).
232. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Industries, Inc., 493 F.2d 275 (8th
Cir. 1974).
233. Id. at 282-83 (neither application to register nor certificate of regis-
tration indicated whether mark was registered as a fanciful trademark or
under § 2(f), but district court's finding that mark was descriptive upheld).
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Hanover trade name cases, 23 4 the Eighth Circuit invoked the
familiar shibboleth of Dawn Donut, to the effect that defen-
dant can not acquire any permanent rights in such Lanham
Act states; on the contrary, he must surrender such territory
to plaintiff anytime the earlier registered trademark acquires
secondary meaning, "regardless of whether [his] "LURjE"
mark has previously acquired a secondary meaning. '235 The
Eighth Circuit case, although the only one decided to date
wherein the theory of qualified protection for registered sec-
ondary meaning trademarks was necessarily involved in the
decision, 23 8 has weak precedential value because its holding is
premised on a patently unsound construction of the Lanham
Act.
The court's guiding principle, to wit, that a "distinctive"
or secondary meaning mark registered under § 2(f) is afforded
substantially the same protection by the Lanham Act as is
provided by the common law, 237 was applied on the erroneous
legal assumption that such a mark cannot become incontest-
able. The district court rested its finding that plaintiff's mark
was descriptive, hence the Bavarian Brewing doctrine appo-
site, on the view that his more than five-year-old registration
constituted but prima facie evidence of ownership, shifting
the burden of going forward with rebuttal evidence to show
that it had not acquired secondary meaning in the disputed
territory to the putative infringer.23 8 The court of appeals,
mindful that a registration becomes incontestable after five
years and constitutes "conclusive evidence of the registrant's
right to use the mark in commerce," not merely a rebuttable
presumption of ownership,239 had to rule that plaintiffs reg-
istration fell under one of the specified statutory exceptions
to incontestability or was otherwise cancellable upon one of
the express grounds stated in the Act if it would uphold the
district court.
234. See text at notes 65-75, supra.
235. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Industries, Inc., 493 F.2d 275, 282
n.11 (8th Cir. 1974).
236. See text at note 218, supra.
237. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Industries, Inc., 493 F.2d 275, 282
(8th Cir. 1974).
238. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Industries, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1114,
1125 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
239. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Industries, Inc., 493 F.2d 275,
281-82 (8th Cir. 1974), quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 1065, 1115(b) (1970) (incontestabil-
ity and registration as evidence, respectively).
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In a classic example of the blind leading the blind, plain-
tiff's counsel invited error when he argued on the appeal that
the district court's finding that the mark was descriptive
should be reversed as clearly erroneous "because 'Pestlur' is
a fanciful mark entitled to incontestable status under the
Lanham Act. ' 240 Since the district court was not unreason-
able in finding that the term "Pestlur" is descriptive of a
product that lures the pest to eat poison, only the Lanham
Act stood in the way of seizing upon counsel's affirmative
pregnant which implied that descriptive marks are ineligible
for incontestable status. However, the court, falling into the
familiar pitfall of assuming that words of art must mean the
same thing wherever they appear in a single statute, found
support for this conclusion in the generic word exception to
the incontestability provision, which denies incontestable
status to the "common descriptive name of any article or
substance. ' '241 It goes without saying that the term "Pestlur,"
cleverly combining two descriptive words into a new term, is
not the product name for rodenticide flavoring.
Since the court expressly reserved judgment on what ef-
fect incontestable status might have on the scope of injunc-
tive relief,242 the Pestlur case may at best be cited as dictum
that a putative infringer, in the case of a § 2(f) contestable
registration, may avoid liability by going forward with evi-
dence243 to show that the registrant's mark has not acquired
secondary meaning in the disputed market area. Even such a
qualified rule, applying only to less than five-year-old § 2(f)
registrations, is out of line with the Lanham Act.
The Act's functional definition of a trademark as "any
word, name, symbol, or device or combination thereof adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods
and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others ' 244 embraces technical common law trademarks, viz.
coined or made-up words like "Kodak" for cameras and arbi-
240. Id. at 281.
241. Id. at 282, citing 15 U.S.C. § 1065(4) (1970).
242. Id. at 281 n.8.
243. The trial court stated it was unnecessary to decide which party has
the burden of persuasion on this issue in view of its finding that absence of
secondary meaning for the term "Pestlur" in all but two states was free from
doubt. Flavor Corp. of America v. Kemin Industries, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 1114,
1125 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970).
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trary or fanciful designations like "Mars" for candy bars, as
well as common law trade names, viz., descriptive or geo-
graphically descriptive words like "Dynashine" for shoe pol-
ish and "Waltham" for watches and personal names like
"Stetson" for hats. This new semantic classification is re-
flected appropriately in the Act's provision for principal re-
gistration of a mark which, though etymologically descriptive
of the goods or their origin or a personal name not classifiable
as a technical common law trademark, has become distinctive
of the applicant's goods.245 Many brand names which had
become potent instruments of goodwill such as "Cadillac" for
automobiles, which is a geographical name, and "Ford" for
automobiles, which is a personal name, could not be regis-
tered as trademarks under the ten-year proviso of the Act of
1905246 because the applicant could not make the requisite
statutory showing of exclusive use for 10 years prior to
1905.247 One purpose of the open-ended provision contained in
§ 2(f) was to permit the registration of such widely known
trade names by incorporating in full the common law princi-
ple of secondary meaning as interpreted by the courts up to
the date of the Lanham Act's passage in 1946.248
The courts, applying principles of unfair competition,
came to recognize that personal names or words descriptive
of the goods or their origin, though less suitable for the pur-
pose of distinguishing one merchant's goods from those sold
by others, could in fact perform the identifying function of
trademarks and should therefore be protected against misap-
propriation. 249 The early common law theory for limitation as
to the character of a mark was based largely on the fear that
judicial recognition of a proper name or descriptive term as
subject to exclusive appropriation by one trader would hand-
icap competitors by abridging their right to use their own
names in their own businesses 25 0 or foster monopolies in trade
245. 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (1970).
246. Act of February 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 5(b), 33 Stat. 726 (second further
proviso).
247. See 1939 Hearings at 23.
248. Id. at 22-24.
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 715, comments (a)-(c), at
34-36 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
250. Compare Hilton v. Hilton, 89 N.J. Eq. 182, 104 A. 375 (Ct. Err. & App.
1918), modifying 89 N.J. Eq. 149, 102 A. 16 (Ch. 1917), with Hat Corp. of
America v. D.L. Davis Corp., 4 F. Supp. 613, 622-23 (D. Conn. 1933).
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by depriving them of the normal ways of describing their
products. 25 1 But the early common law failed to distinguish
between denominative use of a person's name or a descriptive
word to indicate goods made by him, and their use in a pri-
mary lexicographical sense merely to identify a person or
locality or to describe to users of the goods their ingredients,
quality, properties; functions or uses. 25 2 More enlightened
courts, at first imperfectly by means of the explanatory
phrase or distinguishing prefix or suffix, in time came to
protect trade names like trademarks by absolutely prohibit-
ing denominative use and otherwise carefully circumscribing
a subsequent user's privilege to use descriptive or generic
language which was confusingly similar with the brand name,
although the decisions were not uniform. 253
By according equal status, via principal registration, to
secondary meaning marks, the Lanham Act removed what-
ever vestiges of a judicial double standard still existed at the
time of its passage. Etymology was simply thrown out as a
criterion of whether a given brand is a trademark or trade
name, and marks registered under § 2(f) were accorded the
same advantages as coined or fanciful trademarks. However,
Congress, cognizant that an immediate grant of nationwide
trademark rights in personal name or descriptive word brand
names would run counter to the public interest in maximum
competition without serving any countervailing public policy,
reserved § 2(f) registration for the "exceptional" case in which
through extended use or advertising of a brand name it has
become widely known to the public as an indication of
source.25 4 Moreover, special precautions were taken in con-
nection with recognition of such marks to insure that rival
traders could proclaim commercially significant qualities of
their merchandise without incurring liability for infringe-
ment.25 5 Generic words, as distinguished from descriptive de-
signations, exclusive right to which was early seen as incom-
251. See, e.g., Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. 311, 323 (1871) ("Lackawanna
Coal").
252. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 720, comments (a), (d) & (h),
at 78-89 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
253. See Handler & Pickett, Trade-Marks and Trade Names-An Analysis
and Synthesis (pt. 1), 30 COLUM. L. REV. 168, 189-90 (1930).
254. 1938 Hearings at 105-06 (Edward S. Rogers).
255. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1970); 1941 Hearings at 63-64 passim.
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
patible with the right of competition, 256 cannot be registered
as trademarks under the Act.25 7
Properly construed, the five-year clause of § 2(f) does not
authorize registration of a mark that has become distinctive
of the applicant's goods in only one part of the United States;
a defendant should be able to defeat a claim for statutory
trademark infringement, though not ipso facto one for unfair
competition, by proving that plaintiffs mark was not widely
known in commerce at the time of registration and the regis-
tration was therefore invalidly issued. However, absent proof
that the registration was obtained fraudulently, 25 such a
defense would be legally immaterial if plaintiffs mark were
registered at least five years since descriptiveness is not in-
cluded among the specified grounds upon which such regis-
trations may be cancelled. 25 9
Recognition of such a blanket defense to statutory in-
fringement, asserting basic invalidity of a less than five-
year-old § 2(f) registration, bears no resemblance to the
Bavarian Brewing doctrine, which casts upon the registrant
the burden of proving secondary meaning in the disputed
territory as a condition precedent to injunctive relief, or to
the more recent Pestlur dictum which would presumably
allow the putative infringer to introduce evidence of lack of
local secondary meaning by way of affirmative defense. The
slight additional authority evincing the same position 260 is
256. See, e.g., Choynski v. Cohen, 39 Cal. 501 (1870); RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 721 (1938).
257. Section 2 of the Lanham Act recites: "No trade-mark by which the
goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be
refused registration on the principal register .... " 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1970). A
generic word is incapable of performing this identifying function of a
trademark, thus it cannot be registered. Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1970) (regis-
tered trademark which becomes product name may be cancelled at any time).
258. Fraud in procuring the registration is always grounds for cancella-
tion. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1970). But counterclaims in statutory infringement
suits seeking cancellation of plaintiffs registration upon the ground of
fraudulent claims of exclusiveness of use supporting applications to register
have not fared well in court. See, e.g., Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Bavarian
Brewing Co., 264 F.2d 88, 91-92 (6th Cir. 1959); Aluminum Fabricating Co. v.
Season-All Window Corp., 259 F.2d 314, 317-18 (2d Cir. 1958); Haviland & Co. v.
Johann Haviland China Corp., 269 F. Supp. 928, 936-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Con-
tra, E. Vandenburgh, II, TRADEMARK LAW AND PROCEDURE § 2,42, at 53 &
n.6 (1959).
259. 4 R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOP-
OLIES § 98.8(b)(3), at 754-56 (3d ed. 1970); 1941 Hearings at 186-87.
260. E.g., Drug Fair-Community Drug Co. v. Drug Fair, Inc., 453 Pa. 454,
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equally unsound and is contradicted by the better reasoned
decisions. 26 1
A frontal assault upon a contestable § 2(f) registration is
permitted. Guerilla warfare is not. The only relevance of evi-
dence that the registered mark has not achieved local secon-
dary meaning is on the issue of whether the infringer must
account for profits. He should be able to keep whatever profits
were realized through sales of goods bearing the infringing
mark by demonstrating that such sales were not attributable
to his use of said mark because it had no secondary meaning,
therefore no commercial magnetism, in the disputed market
area.
262
If § 2(f) is construed in accordance with Congressional
intent, the crux of the problem that was originally perceived
in allowing one merchant to take as his mark a word that is
descriptive of significant qualities of his product will be
largely avoided. Extensive use of a brand name so descriptive
as to give one competitor an edge in the market will inspire
imitations by his trade rivals before expiration of the five-
year "gestation" period presumptive of the right to register,
thus precluding registration in most instances. 26 3 Exceptions
would be rare, limited by the rather extraordinary combina-
tion of events that can give such a descriptive brand name
wide currency overnight, as happened with "Dynashine" shoe
polish after World War 1.264 Moreover, assuming even an in-
contestable registration for such an exceptional mark, and
notwithstanding there are many ways to describe a shoe
polish preparation, the Act carefully preserves the right of a
competitor to inform prospective purchasers that his product
460 n.3, 309 A.2d 363, 366 n.3 (1973) (but no market competition); Union
Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 185 U.S.P.Q. 464 (N.D. Ill. 1975) (related
but non-competing goods).
261. E.g., Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44 (5th Cir. 1975); Tisch
Hotels, Inc., v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1965); cf. John R.
Thompson Co. v. Holloway, 366 F.2d 108, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1966) (defense that
registered trademark "primarily merely a surname" foreclosed by incontest-
able registration).
262. See Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S. S. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203 (1942) (burden is on infringer to show profits are not attributable to
unlawful use of registered trademark); accord, Williamson-Dickie Mfg. Co. v.
Davis Mfg. Co., 251 F.2d 924 (3d Cir. 1958).
263. See, e.g., Andrew J. McPartland, Inc. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 164
F.2d 603 (C.C.P.A. 1947).
264. Barton v. Rex-Oil Co., 2 F.2d 402, 404-05 (3d Cir. 1924), modified on
petition for rehearing, 29 F.2d 474, 475 (3d Cir. 1928).
1976]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
both dyes and shines, 265 provided only he does not use the
words as a trademark and does not give them undue promi-
nence on the package. 26
6
The only way a manufacturer could widely market a
product for five years under a highly descriptive brand name
free of imitations is under letters patent for the product.
However, the trademark examiner in the Patent Office, in
passing upon an application to register a descriptive brand
name for a patented article under the five-year clause of
§ 2(f), should not credit periods of exclusive use of the brand
name which transpired during the life of the patent. Even
though no rule disallows acquisition of a trademark for a
patented article 267 and the patent monopoly may facilitate
the development of secondary meaning for its descriptive
brand name, such exclusiveness of use is not sufficiently
probative of the fact that the applicant's mark has become
distinctive and therefore does not warrant application of the
statutory presumption. 268 Customer preference for the de-
scriptive brand name of the patented merchandise may be
attributable to a difficult or hard to remember product name,
hence reflecting that the public is using the brand name ge-
nerically, not that it has acquired secondary meaning.26 9
CONCLUSION: RIGHTS NOT ENFORCED AMOUNT ONLY
TO PARCHMENT LAW
Like its fellow traveler the Dawn Donut rule, the Ba-
varian Brewing doctrine sabotages the Act's twofold goal of
protecting the purchasing public against fraud and the
trademark owner's investment from misappropriation by in-
265. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (1970).
266. See, e.g., Frostie Co. v. Dr. Pepper Co., 341 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1965).
267. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 735, comment (b) on subsec-
ti6n (1) at 120-21 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963) ("patented goods"); Derenberg,
"Shredded Wheat"-The Still-Born Trade-Mark, 16 N.Y.U.L. REV. 376, 382
(1939).
268. 1 NIMs § 207 at 576-78. See also Moy, Lanham Act Registration of a
Container or Product Shape as a Trademark, 60 Trade-Mark Rep. 71, 87
(1970).
269. 1 NIMS at 579-80. Cf. Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505
(S.D.N.Y. 1921) ("Aspirin" for acetyl salicylic acid); Rice-Stix Dry Goods Co. v.
J.A. Scriven Co., 165 F. 639, 644-45 (8th Cir. 1908) ("Elastic Seam" for "Scri-
ven's Elastic Seam" men's underwear); accord, Newcomer & Lewis v. Scriven
Co., 168 F. 621 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 214 U.S. 518 (1909).
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definitely postponing effective relief against infringement of
federally registered trademarks. Distortion of the statutory
phrase "likely to cause confusion" is again the formula for
reentry of parochial habits of judicial thought into the realm
of federal statutory trademark law. Nationwide protection for
federally registered trademarks has all too often received
only abstract recognition from courts that have lost sight of
the Lanham Act's noble purpose to promote fair dealing
among businessmen and to protect the purchasing public
from fraud and deception. An enlightened trademark bar
must now fight to make the principle of nationwide protection
a living reality in the courts rather than a prophecy of things
to come.
